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CONDITIONS AND LIMITATIONS IN RESTRAINT
OF MARRIAGE*

Olin Browder, Jr. t

F

ROM ancient times it has been a practice of testators 1 to provide
for the termination of a devised estate upon the marriage of the
devisee, or to make their gifts conditional upon a beneficiary's marrying in a prescribed manner. In this way, a parent may hope to extend
beyond his death his influence over recalcitrant or irresponsible offspring. But restraints on marriage may have other purposes. More
often than not, a testator, by limiting an estate until marriage or by
providing for forfeiture upon marriage, may merely seek to assure
the maintenance of a female beneficiary until a husband assumes that
responsibility.
Almost from the beginning provisions of this kind have been declared illegal as being in restraint of marriage and contrary to public
policy. Just what sort of social evil may be expected to result from
these provisions has never been agreed upon. The Romans were the
first to annul conditions in restraint of marriage,2 but the basis for the
rule, even in this ancient origin, is doubtful. It has been said that the
depleted population of that nation, resulting from the civil wars, was
the cause. 3 It has also been suggested that conditions restraining marriage were used as a subterfuge to escape the Roman rule against the
disherison of heirs and were declared illegal for that reason. 4

*

This article is based upon a paper submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Juridical Science of the University of Michigan.
- The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor Lewis M. Simes of that
University for his counsel in the preparation of this article.
Assistant Professor of Business Law, University of Alabama. A.B., LL.B., Illinois. Member of the Illinois bar.-Ed.
1 Most marriage restraints have been used in connection with testamentary gifts.
There are a very few cases, however, where they have appeared in deeds. The same
principles have been applied to both. For convenience, testamentary terms will be used
in the following discussion. The use of marriage restraints in other instruments will
be indicated in the footnotes when such cases are cited.
2 Dxc. 28.7.14, 35.1.22, 35.1.62, 35.1.63, 35.1.64, 35.1.72; CoDE 6.40.1.
3 Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. 89 at 96, 30 Eng. Rep. 909 (1796); Hervey
v. Aston, West T. Hard. 350 at 434, 25 Eng. Rep. 975 (1737).
4 Hervey v. Aston, West T. Hard. 350 at 396, 25 Eng. Rep. 975 (1737);
Pound, "Legacies on Impossible or Illegal Conditions Precedent," 3 ILL. L. REV.
I ;it 5 (1908).
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The Roman attitude was imported into the English law, but the
nature of the public interest to be protected has for the most part
either been tacitly assumed or ignored by the English courts. In one
case the concern was asserted to be moral. 11 Marriage, being a command
of God, was not to be interfered with by any man. Licentiousness, it
was said, would likely follow an uninhibited use of conditions which
restrain marriage. On another occasion it was asserted that parental
duties are violated by such conditions, which strip children of their
just expectations. 6
In this country it has been asserted, in addition to the moral factor,
that the welfare of society depends upon having well-assorted marriages, and that accordingly the freedom of choice of a mate should be
protected. 7
The rules to achieve the end sought have been devised haphazardly.
The problem has never excited sufficient interest to induce the thorough
investigation necessary to get to the heart of it. Disagreements as to
the nature of the public interest to be protected, conflicts and errors
in the construction of these conditions and limitations, along with an
undercurrent of resistance to any prohibition of marriage restraints,
have produced a confusion possibly without parallel in the law.
Some attempt to clarify is desirable. New cases have come up
steadily if not frequently, and perpetuation of the existing chaos would
be a discredit to our tribunals. It is the purpose of this article to suggest, by a discussion of the origin and development of the marriage
restraint rules in England and in this country, the reasons for the
prevalent confusion in the cases, and to ascertain whether there are
not possible bases for an ultimate agreement. An attempt will be made
to summarize the existing state of the law in so far as any definite
conclusions are warranted.
It seems desirable before discussing the cases to list the various
rules governing marriage restraints which have been asserted by courts
and writers to embody the law on this subject. It is disconcerting in
this study to discover that what the courts take to be the law is not
always made the basis of their decisions. To what extent the rules
asserted do not explain the cases it is the purpose here to inquire. In
5

Low v. Peers, Wilm. 364 at 371, 97 Eng. Rep. 138 (1770).
Scott v. Tyler, Dick. 7xz at 718, 21 Eng. Rep. 448 (1788).
7 Maddox v. Maddox's Admr., II Grat. (52 Va.) 804 at 806 (1854). See quotation from case at note 86, infra.
6
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no sense is the following list intended as the writer's summary of the
law. 8
I. Conditions that a beneficiary shall not marry are contrary to
public policy and illegal. ( Such conditions are herein termed conditions in general restraint of marriage.)
2. Conditions restraining the remarriage of widows are exceptions
to the first rule and are valid.
3. Conditions in partial restraint of marriage, i.e., those against
marriage without the consent of specified persons, or against marriage
before a certain age, against marriage with certain persons or classes,
etc., are valid. (It is said that the partial restraint must be reasonable,
otherwise it is illegal.)
4. Limitations of estates to widows so long as they remain widows
( or during widowhood) or to single persons so long as they remain
single are not conditions and are valid.
5. Conditions not to marry, when not accompanied by a gift over
upon breach of the condition, are in terrorem and void (herein termed
the in terrorem doctrine).
It will be necessary to examine in some detail the origin of these
rules in the English cases. The circumstances of these origins may
reveal factors which will aid in the appraisal of the worth of the rules
in our system today.
THE ENGLISH CASES

The task of analyzing any part of early English testamentary law
is made especially difficult by the unfortunate cleavage in the treatment
of legacies and devises. Exclusive jurisdiction over legacies was vested
8
It would be impracticable to cite all of the assertions in cases or texts to the
effect that the rules mentioned represent the law of marriage restraints. It is not to
be thought that there is complete agreement among the courts and writers upon all or any
of these rules; but if the pertinent textual material and the bulk of court dicta are taken
all together, the impression is left that the rules stated do represent the law. In no
particular case in the following list of representative cases have all of the rules been
faid down as listed by the writer here. Kennedy v. Alexander, 21 App. D. C. 424
(1903); Anderson v. Crawford, 202 Iowa 207, 207 N. W. 571 (1926); Dumey v.
Schoeffier, 24 Mo. 170 (1857); Matter of Liberman, 279 N. Y. 458, 18 N. E. (2d)
658 (1939); Otis v. Prince, IO Gray (76 Mass.) 581 (1858); Hogan v. Curtin,
88 N. Y. 162 (1882); Wooten v. House, (Tenn. Ch. App. 1895) 36 S. W. 932;
Maddox v. Maddox's Admr., II Grat. (52 Va.) 804 (1854). ATKINSON, WILLS 352
(1937); l TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 197 (1939); 2 }ARMAN, WILLS,
7th ed., 1496 (1930); 2 PoMERoY, EQUITY JuRISPRUDENcE, 4th ed., § 933 (1918);
2 PAGE, WILLS, 2d ed., § II47 (1926).
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in the ecclesiastical courts at about the beginning of the thirteenth century. 9 This jurisdiction was later shared by the Court of Chancery.10
When devises of real estate received legal sanction in the Statute of
Wills in I 540, they were administered by the common-law courts
and by the Court of Chancery according to the rules of the common
law.11
The appearance of the marriage restraint doctrine in England is
obscure. Any enlightenment upon the earliest treatment of the problem must be gathered from dicta in later cases, which unfortunately are
often conflicting. It seems that the marriage restraint rules :first appeared in the ecclesiastical courts. The canon law was based in great
part upon the civil law, and in the treatment of marriage restraints the
civil law was imported in toto. The rules of the church courts were
applied also by chancery in dealing with legacies in order to maintain
uniformity.12
Since the ecclesiastical jurisdiction extended only to legacies, it was
understood that nothing in the civil law was controlling in cases involving devises of real estate.18 It is difficult to ascertain, however, the
attitude of the temporal judges, when unfettered by ecclesiastical precedents, toward marriage restraints. It is certain that they were not as
receptive to the civil-law doctrine as their ecclesiastical brethren. Unfortunately there are few pronouncements of any common-law courts, and
they are not very revealing.14 It is fairly well established, however,
9

1 HoLDSWOR.TH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 3d ed., 627 (1922).
3 id. 541 (1923); l id. 629 (1922).
11
7 id., 2d ed., 362 (1937).
12
Horrell v. Waldron, 2 Freem. Ch. 83, 22 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1681). The following cases may be consulted for rather extensive discussions of the origin and development of the marriage restraint rules in the church courts and in chancery: Scott
v. Tyler, Dick. 712 at 718, 21 Eng. Rep. 448 (1788); Hervey v. Aston, West T.
Hard. 350 at 389, 25 Eng. Rep. 975 (1737); Keily v. Monck, 3 Ridg. Par!. Rep.
(Ire.) 205 at 247 (1795); Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. 89 at 97, 30 Eng. Rep. 909
(1796); Rhenish v. Martin, 1 Wils. K. B. 130 at 131, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746); In
re Whiting's Settlement, [ l 90 5] l Ch. 96 at II 5; Re Dickson, l Sim. (N. S.) 37 at
43, 61 Eng. Rep. 14 (1850); Bellairs v. Bellairs, L. R. 18 Eq. Cas. 510 at 514
(1874); Williams v. Fry, l Mod. 86 at 88, 86 Eng. Rep. 752 (1670).
18 Fry v. Porter, l Mod. 300 at 308, 86 Eng. Rep. 898 (1671); Pullen v. Ready,
2 Atk. 587 at 590, 26 Eng. Rep. 751 (1743); Hervey v. Aston, West T. Hard. 350
at 425, 25 Eng. Rep. 975 (1737); Scott v. Tyler, Dick. 712 at 719, 21 Eng. Rep.
448 (1788); Jones v. Jones, l Q. B. Div. 279 at 282 (1876).
14
In Low v. Peers, Wilm. 364, 97 Eng. Rep. 138 (1770), a contract in restraint
of .marriage was declared illegal, and in a dictum at page 375 it was indicated that
there was some aversion to conditions in restraint of marriage at common law. In Long
10
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that partial restraints at least were considered valid.15 Evidence as to
the position taken by the English judges towards general restraints is
conflicting.16 Perhaps no occasion ever arose for taking one position or
the other. It seems probable that the marriage restraint doctrine in
England was completely an importation from the civil law.
A thorough understanding of the development of the present
marriage restraint doctrine requires separate treatment of the several
rules.

A. General Restraints-The Condition-Limitation Distinction
It is assumed by many today that conditions in general or total
restraint of marriage have always been illegal.17 It is surprising, therefore, to find that the English cases dealing with such conditions are
conflicting and inconclusive. It is equally surprising to discover that
there appears to have been but one reported decision upon the legality
of general restraints until almost the middle of the nineteenth century.18 By the Roman law they were void in all cases.19 It was said that
y. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052, 98 Eng. Rep. 69 (1767), Lord Mansfield, in a dictum at
page 2055, stated that marriage restraints were odious and were to be strictly construed, and he recognized the applicability of the in terrorem doctrine under certain
circumstances. In Williams v. Fry, I Mod. 86, 86 Eng. Rep. 752 (1670), a condition
requiring consent to marry was construed to be a valid limitation. Valid limitations
were also found in Page v. Hayward, 2 Salk. 570, 91 Eng. Rep. 481 (1705), and
Hastings v. Douglas, Cro. Car. 343, 79 Eng. Rep. 901 (1634). In Perrin v. Lyon,
9 .East 170, 103 Eng. Rep. 538 (1807), a condition against marrying a Scotchman
was held valid, and not in terrorem, there being a gift over. (The great bulk of the
early marriage restraint cases which have been reported were decided in chancery.)
15 See note 65, infra, for the common-law position as to conditions requiring
consent to marry. All other partial restraints were valid by both civil and common law.
(See notes 55, 56, and 57.)
16 See discussion immediately following.
17 Consider the references cited in ·note 8, supra. These are but representative.
The cases, both English and American, are full of remarks to this effect, made more or
less upon casual surveys of the problem.
18 Hastings v. Douglas, Cro. Car. 343, 79 Eng. Rep. 901 (1634), in which a
gift during widowhood was construed to be a valid limitation and not a condition.
In Marples v. Bainbridge, l Madd. 590, 56 Eng. Rep. 217 (1816), a condition against
the remarriage of a widow was held to be in terrorem and void, there being no gift
over.
19 DIG. 35.1.22; 2 SWINBURNE, WILLS, 7th ed., 487, note (1803); I ROBY,
RoMAN PRIVATE LAw 317 (1902); Wo01>, A NEw INSTITUTE OF THE IMPERIAL oR
CIVIL LAw 26 (1704); Keily v. Monck, 3 Ridg. Par!. Rep. (Ire.) 205 (1795);
Long v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052, 98 Eng. Rep. 69 (1767); Scott v. Tyler, Dick. 712,
21 Eng. Rep. 448 (1788).
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this rule was applied by the church courts, and likewise in chancery, if
the condition were attached to a gift of a legacy. 20
Of the early writers on the common law, only the author of Sheppard's Touchstone has anything to say about marriage restraints, and a
statement appears there that general restraints were void, 21 although
it is not certain that the rule was not expressed to include legacies upon
condition. Dicta in two cases, Low v. Peers 22 and Keily v. Monck,28
suggest that general restraints were void by the common law. On the
other hand, Lord Mansfield stated that conditions in restraint of marriage were odious and were to be held to the utmost rigor and strictness, 2~ which leaves the inference that they must have been valid. In
a dictum in Hervey v. Aston,25 it is definitely stated that there was
nothing in the English law against marriage restraints. Several dicta,
moreover, have appeared in cases since the beginning of the eighteenth
century which leave the impression that the adoption of the civil-law
rules by the church courts was responsible for any prohibitions which
might exist in England toward any kind of marriage restraint. 28 From
this conflict of opinion, no conclusive statement can be made regarding
the legality of general restraints by the early common law.
At this point, it is desirable to turn to another aspect of the problem in order that the more recent holdings on general restraints can
properly be appraised.
The origin of determinable fees and determinable life estates at
common law is somewhat obscure, but the determinable fee, at least,
was probably recognized before the thirteenth century.27 It was understood that such estates were to be distinguished from estates upon condition subsequent. The distinction was observed because of the di:ff erent
manner of termination of the two kinds of estates, the one ending auto20 Horrell v. Waldron, 2 Freem. Ch. 83, 22 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1681); Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. 89 at 96, 30 Eng. Rep. 909 (1796); Kelly v. Monck,
3 Ridg. Parl. Rep. (Ire.) 205 (1795). See also the general discussions in the cases
cited in note 1 2.
21
SHEPPARD, TOUCHSTONE 132 (1648).
22
Wilm. 364 at 375, 97 Eng. Rep. 138 (1770).
28
3 Ridg. Parl. Rep. (Ire.) 205 (1795).
24
Long v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052 at 2055, 98 Eng. Rep. 69 (1767).
25
West T. Hard 350 at 413, 25 Eng. Rep. 975 (1737).
28
Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. 89 at 97, 30 Eng. Rep. 909 (1796); Hervey
v. Aston, West T. Hard. 350 at 413, 25 Eng. Rep. 975 (1737); Re Dickson, 1
Sim. (N. S.) 37 at 44, 61 Eng. Rep. 14 (1850); Jones v. Jones, l Q. B. Div. 279 at
282 {1876). Cf. Case XXVI, Jenk. 242, 145 Eng. Rep. 170 (sixth century), in which
it is stated that a condition against marriage, attached to a fee simple estate, is valid.
27
l SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS, § 17 (1936).
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matically, the other requiring re-entry for condition broken. The determinable estate was sometimes spoken of as an estate upon limitation,
and the language defining the limitation came to be spoken of merely as
a "limitation," in order to contrast it with language imposing the
proviso or defeasance in an estate on condition subsequent, which was
called a "condition." 28
It was natural that both were used in creating estates intended to
terminate upon_ the marriage of the beneficiary. In the one case the
dispositive instrument would contain the clause, "so long as he ( or
she) remains unmarried"; in the other it would be, "if he ( or she)
does not marry" or "in case he should marry" or "provided he does
not marry." It may be difficult to understand how the distinction observed is relevant to the legality of these two kinds of clauses. Yet as
early as the middle of the seventeenth century a bequest to a widow
during her widowhood was held to create a limitation, the validity of
which could not be questioned, since any policy which might exist
against marriage restraints had to do with conditions.29
Although this distinction was definitely of common-law origin,8°
it came to be generally accepted and has been applied wherever possible both as to legacies and as to devises. 31 Only a few dissenting voices
have been raised to question its substantiality. 82 Its application down to
28 See discussion in 2 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 155-157 (1756), and SHEPPARD, ToucHSTONE II8 (1648).
29 Hastings v. Douglas, Cro. Car. 343, 79 Eng. Rep. 901 (1634).
80 The writer is not prepared to say whether there was anything in the Roman
law comparable to this distinction or not; but it was never used, in so far as available
materials show, as a basis for determining the legality of marriage restraints, either in
the Roman or canon law. In Low v. Peers, Wilm. 364, 97 Eng. Rep. 138 (1770),
the court at page 376 said that the Roman "modus" was comparable to the English
limitation.
31 Real property: Williams v. Fry, 1 Mod. 86, 86 Eng. Rep. 752 (1670);
Godfrey v. Hughes, 1 Rob. Eccl. 593, 163 Eng. Rep. n47 (1847); Page v. Hayward, 2 Salk. 570, 91 Eng. Rep. 481 (1705). Personal property: Hastings v. Douglas, Cro. Car. 343, 79 Eng. Rep. 901 (1634); Heath v. Lewis, 3 De G. M. & G.
954, 43 Eng. Rep. 374 (1853); Allen v. Jackson, l Ch. Div. 399 (1874); In re
Hewett, [1918] l Ch. 458. Mixed property: In re Wagstaff, [1907] 2 Ch. 35.
Covenant: Webb v. Grace, 2 Phil. 701, 41 Eng. Rep. n14 (1848). The distinction
was recognized in dicta in the following cases: Low v. Peers, Wilm. 364 at 374, 97
Eng. Rep. 138 (1770); Morley v. Rennoldson, '2 Hare 570 at 579, 67 Eng. Rep.
235 (1843); Re Bellamy, 48 L. T. 212 (1883). The validity of a limitation until
marriage was assumed in Pile v. Salter, 5 Sim. 4n, 58 Eng. Rep. 391 (1832).
32 Marples v. Bainbridge, l Madd. 590, 56 Eng. Rep. 217 (1816); Rishton v.
Cobb, 5 Myl. & Cr. 145, 41 Eng. Rep. 326 (1839); Potter v. Richards, 24 L. J.
(N. S.) (Ch.) 488 (1855).
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the present has placed a severe limitation upon the operation of the
rules against marriage restraints.
A few efforts were made to give some substance to the distinction.
In Morley v. Rennoldson 33 the court said,
"where property was limited to a person until she married, and
when she married then over, the limitation was good. It is difficult to see how this could be otherwise, for in such a case there is
nothing to give an interest beyond marriage."
Less technical and more significant statements appear in two other
earlier cases. In Scott v. Tyler 84 this dictum appears,
"according to Godolphin, the use of a thing may be given during
celibacy; for the purpose of intermediate maintenance, will not
be interpreted maliciously to a charge of restraining marriage."
A similar but more elaborate justification for the distinction is offered
in Low v. Peers,8 5 to the effect that a condition imports an intention
to restrain marriage while the use of a limitation evidences only a
desire to supply maintenance until marriage.
One suspects that the application of this distinction is an indication
of the attitude of the English judges toward the Roman rule, and
represents an effort to escape from it in all cases where the distinction
could be applied. Color is added to this supposition by several cases
where language which would normally import conditions was construed to create valid limitations. sG
In Evans v. Rosser 81 there was a gift to the testator's son-in-law
"during his natural life or marriage again," with a gift over "after the
decease or marriage again" of the son-in-law. This ambiguous language
was held to create a valid limitation. The court said,
"in all cases where you do not find the words of the precise kind
which would import a strict condition, you are able to escape
the difficulties which have sometimes been the occasion of embarrassment." 88
2 Hare 570 at 579-580, 67 Eng. Rep. 235 (1843).
Dick. 712 at 722, 21 Eng. Rep. 448 (1788).
85 Wilm. 364 at 374, 97 Eng. Rep. 138 (1770).
86 Williams v. Fry, 1 Mod. 86, 86 Eng. Rep. 752 (1670); Page v. Hayward,
2 Salk. 570, 91 Eng. Rep. 481 (1705); Webb v. Grace, 2 Phil. 701, 41 Eng. Rep.
III4 (1848); Allen v. Jackson, l Ch. Div. 399 (1874).
87 2 Hem. & M. 190, 31 Eng. Rep. 435 (1864).
88 Id., 2 Hem. & M. at 195.
88
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Webb v. Grace 89 involved a_contract to pay an annuity to a single
woman subject to a proviso which declared that if the annuitant should
marry, her annuity should be reduced by half. The court, making no
distinction in this respect between a contract and a testamentary provision, found the provision to be a valid limitation. The explanation
1s given,
"There can be no doubt that marriage may be made the ground of
a. limitation ceasing or commencing. . . . There is [not] an unqualified grant of an annuity . . . for life, and an attempt to
defeat the gift by an illegal condition subsequent. The contract
and obligation is not absolute and unqualified, but explained,
qualified, and bound by the proviso, and must be construed precisely in the same manner as if the terms of the proviso had been
introduced into and made part of the contract and obligation." 40
By reasoning of this sort, conditions in restraint of marriage may be
construed out of existence. First, a distinction is drawn between void
conditions and valid limitations; then conditions are construed to be
limitations.
From this point discussion of general restraints can be continued.
The more recent cases upon general restraints fall roughly into two
categories.
In Morley v. Rennoldson,41 a condition against marriage attached
to a bequest of personal property was held void. The decision was
made regretfully, since the court believed that the rule was imported
from the Roman law and was not well adapted to English society. The
court did not question, however, that the rule applied was the law of
England at that time, although no authorities were cited. Three other
cases were decided by the same rule, all involving personal bequests.42
In Bellairs v. Bellairs 48 the gift was of income from a fund created by
the sale of real and personal property. The court found that in such
a case the rule applicable to personal legacies is to be applied, which,
it was said, is the rule originating in the civil law, and accordi11g to
which the condition was void.
If limitations are to be upheld because they evidence an intention
2 Phil. 701, 41 Eng. Rep. 1114 (1848).
Id. 2 Phil. at 702, 703.
41 2 Hare 570, 67 Eng. Rep. 235 (1843).
42 Lloyd v. Lloyd, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 255, 61 Eng. Rep. 338 (1852); Bellairs v.
Bellairs, L. R. 18 Eq. Cas. 510 (1874); Re Bellamy, 48 L. T. 212 (1883).
43 L. R. 18 Eq. Cas. 510 (1874).
89

40
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only to provide maintenance until marriage, then it is an easy step to
the proposition that conditions likewise should be enforced where it
appears that testators, in using them, do not intend to restrain marriage.
The second category of cases exemplifies this proposition.44
Potter v. Richards 45 and In re Hewett 46 both dealt with gifts to
single women by whom the respective testators had had illegitimate
children, forfeiture in whole or in part being provided for in case the
beneficiaries should marry. In the latter case, the latest English decision
on general restraints, the court construed the language to be a limitation, upon the authority of Webb v. Grace. The court, however, was
not willing to place its decision upon that ground alone, and in fact
disparaged the condition-limitation distinction with the remark that a
wanton restraint on marriage could be accomplished as easily by one
form of words as the other. The court added that a condition in restraint of marriage is prima facie void, but concluded,
"The real question seems to be whether the testator intended to
restrain marriage or not." 41
The presumption of illegality was overcome, very easily it seems, by
the finding that no intention to restrain existed. Potter v. Richards
was cited as authority.
In Potter v. Richards the testator stated in his will that, if the
mother married, their child would likely be neglected. The court decided that, since the child's welfare prompted the use of the condition,
this was no wanton restraint of marriage, and was valid. Most assuredly
the testator here intended to restrain the marriage of his child's mother.
The decision, then, must have been based upon the fact that behind
the intention was a motive, based on parental obligation, which seemed
to make the restraint justified.
Jones v. Jones 48 contained an ordinary condition against the marriage of a single woman. Here, too, the condition was enforced. The
condition was attached to a devise of real property, and the court declared that the rules pertaining to legacies had no application. It was
decided that by the common law, which is applicable to devises, the
condition is against public policy only when the object is to promote
44

Potter v. Richards, 24 L. J. (N. S.) (Ch.) 488 (1855); Jones v. Jones,
I Ch. 458.
45
24 L. J. (N. S.) {Ch.) 488 (1855).
48
[1918] I Ch. 458.
41
Id. at 467, quoting Jones v. Jones, 1 Q. B. Div. 279 at 281 (1876).
48
1 Q. B. Div. 279 {1876).

Q. B. Div. 279 {1876); In re Hewett, [ 1918]
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celibacy. No such object was found, and so the situation was said to be
the same as though the testator had used a limitation. There is nothing
in the report of the case to suggest upon what this conclusion was
based. There seems to be something in the nature of a presumption in
these cases against the presence of the unlawful intention.

B. C onditiom Against Remarriage
Although conditions restraining the remarriage of widows are
general restraints, they have always received separate treatment. The
Romans exempted the case of widows from their rule against general
restraints, 49 and the English decisions, with one exception, have done
the same. 50 The position taken in several of these cases is that the testators had the interests of their children foremost in their minds, that a
remarriage of their widows would prejudice those interests, and so the
restraint in such cases is justified. It seems to have been overlooked that
if the forfeited property is given over to a third person when such a
condition is enforced, the result is hardly the best provision for the
needs of the children.
In Allen v. Jackson 61 the rule was extended to the case of a surviving husband. The reason given for enforcing the condition was that if
the husband remarried he would likely neglect his first family.
Suppose there are no children with interests to be protected by
restraining the widow's remarriage. Probably the condition would still
be upheld. In Newton v. Marsden 52 the court did not place its decision
primarily upon the ground of protecting the children. Rather the court
said that there was no authority in the common law, independently of
the civil law, for finding such a condition void. (In fact, such conditions were not void even by the civil law.) The court then said that it
was not anxious to carry the rule against marriage restraints beyond the
old authorities. No objection was found to the condition upon principle
since, it was said, a widow always has the option of marrying and
giving up the bounty. The latter argument is significant, for it may be
Code 6.40.1; 1 RoBY, RoMAN PruvATE LAW 317 (1902); WooD, A NEW
LAw 26 (1704).
50 Newton v. Marsden, 2 J. & H. 356, 70 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1862); Allen v.
Jackson, 1 Ch. Div. 399 (1874); Lloyd v. Lloyd, 2 Sim. (N. S.) 255, 61 Eng. Rep.
338 (1852); Tricker v. Kingsbury, 7 W. R. 652 (1859); Brooke v. Spong, 15
M. & W. 153, 153 Eng. Rep. 801 (1846); validity assumed in Pile v. Salter, 5 Sim.
411, 58 Eng. Rep. 391 (1832).
51 1 Ch. Div. 399 (1874).
52 2 J. & H. 356, 70 Eng. Rep. 109-4- (1862).
49
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applied to any kind of marriage restraint. It has, in fact, been adopted
by several American courts to sustain all marriage conditions. 58
Marples v. Bainbridge 54 is the only case contra. It represents the
· only backwash upon the persistent current in the English cases away
from the original civil-law marriage-restraint rules. A condition upon
a gift to a widow that she remain unmarried was held void, in the
absence of a gift over on breach of the condition. The condition-limitation distinction was repudiated as being "too refined." This is the only
English case in which the in terrorem doctrine was applied to a general
restraint. It stands alone, and is likely to remain so; it has not been
referred to in any other case.

C. Partial Restraints-The In Terrorem Doctrine
It seems to have been of much concern to the families of the English nobility that their children make suitable matches. The great
majority of the English marriage-restraint cases have dealt with conditions requiring beneficiaries to obtain consent to marry. The results
in these cases can be understood only by considering that remarkable
rule now referred to as the in terrorem doctrine. Apart from it, the courts
have been favorably disposed toward partial restraints, of whatever
character. Conditions against marrying a particular person or into a
particular class were not uncommon, and were enforced upon several
occasions. 55 In one case the court held valid a condition against marrying before the age of twenty-one. 56 In two cases, one recent, involving
conditions requiring consent to marry, it was held that if a breach
imposes only a partial forfeiture upon the beneficiary, that is, if he
is provided for in either event, the condition is valid. 51 Only in one
case has a partial restraint been held void upon grounds of public
policy. In thit case, In re Lanyon,58 the condition was against marriage
with a blood relation. Since the court believed that it would be almost
impossible to know who was not one's blood relation, the condition
was found to impose a probable prohibition of marriage, a total reCf. note 99, infra.
I Madd. 590, 56 Eng. Rep. 217 (1816).
55 Jarvis v. Duke, I Vern. 19, 23 Eng. Rep. 274 (1681); Perrin v. Lyon, 9
East. 170, 103 Eng. Rep. 538 (1807); Jenner v. Turner, 16 Ch. Div. 188 (1880);
In re Bathe, [ I 92 5] Ch. 377; In re Hanlon, [ I 93 3] Ch. 2 54.
56 Younge v. Furse, 8 De G. M. & G. 756, 44 Eng. Rep. 581 (1857).
61 Gillet v. Wray, I P. Wms. 284, 24 Eng. Rep. 390 (1715); In re Nourse,
[1899] 1 Ch. 63.
ISS [1927] 2 Ch. 26458
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straint, which was void. It is interesting to note that none of the cases
which have enforced total restraints were cited. Possibly they were
overlooked, for the court assumed that total restraints were illegal.
Probably they were not thought pertinent, as they would not have
been, since it could not be asserted here either that the provision was a
limitation or that the testator did not intend to restrain marriage.
In two cases gifts were made in remainder to beneficiaries upon
condition that they be unmarried at the time of the death of the life
tenants. 59 The conditions were upheld, but not upon the courts' determination of their legality. In one case the condition was sustained
because it was a condition precedent, and, in the court's belief, subject
to different ~equirements from a condition subsequent. 60 In other words,
a condition precedent must be performed if the beneficiary is to take,
without regard to its legality. The other case seems to go on the same
basis, although the court spoke of the provision as a limitation. Although one of the cases cited involved a bequest of personal property,61
this rule is of common-law origin/2 and represents the attitude of the
common-law courts toward conditions precedent generally.
The origin of the in terrorem doctrine was discussed by this writer
on a previous occasion. 68 A summary of that discussion will suffice for
the present purposes.
By the civil law all conditions requiring consent to marry were
considered as mere evasions of the rule forbidding general restraints,
and were accordingly held void. 64 On the other hand, the English
judges were disposed to enforce that due regard for parental dictates in
the choice of mates upon which the English social structure of that
day depended, and accordingly looked with favor upon such conditions.65 The Court of Chancery came to deal with conditions requiring
59 Godfrey v. Hughes, I Rob. Eccl. 593, 163 Eng. Rep. II47 ~1847); Heath
v. Lewis, 3 De G. M. & G. 954, 43 Eng. Rep. 374 (1853).
60 Godfrey v. Hughes, I Rob. Eccl. 593, 163 Eng. Rep. II47 (1847).
61 Heath v. Lewis, 3 De G. M. & G. 954, 43 Eng. Rep. 374 (1853).
62 2 ]ARMAN, WILLS, 7th ed., 1443 (1930).
63 Browder, "Testamentary Conditions Against Contest," 36 MICH. L. REv.
1066 at 1092 (1938).
64 DIG. 35.1.72(4).
65 There are no reported cases in which the legality of these conditions was expressly passed upon by the common-law courts. But see the cases cited in note 14,
supra, in which these conditions were declared to be valid limitations by common-law
courts. Also in several chancery cases, involving devises of real estate, the conditions
were enforced. [In one of these cases, Fry v. Porter, 1 Mod. 300, 86 Eng. Rep. 898
(1671), the condition was expressly declared to be valid.] In these chancery cases,
Sheriff v. Morlock, W. Kel. 23, 25 Eng. Rep. 476 (1731), and Long v. Ricketts, 2
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consent to marry in cases involving both legacies and devises. In dealing with legacies, it felt obliged to apply the civil or canon-law rule,
in order to maintain uniformity of treatment. It was generally recognized, however, that the canon law was not controlling in dealing with
devises, 66 and the chancery judges, favoring consent-to-marry conditions, were not disposed to make an exception of them. But this left
the court in an embarrassing predicament, in which it might be necessary to declare the same condition both legal and illegal in the same
case, if that case involved both a legacy and a devise upon a condition
requiring consent to marry. The way the court took out of this difficulty is very interesting, to say the least.
It appears that the church courts sometimes enforced consent-tomarry conditions when the property was given over, upon breach, to
"pious uses." 67 Perhaps this exception to the prohibition imposed by
the church courts stimulated the imagination of the judges of the
Court of Chancery. At any rate, it finally came about that this condition was enforced when dealing with devises; but in dealing with
legacies, attention was diverted from the problem of legality by converting it into a problem of construction. If the condition requiring
consent to marry were not followed by a gift over on breach, it would
be presumed that the testator intended the condition to operate only
in terrorem, that is, to be inoperative except in its ability to induce
performance by a beneficiary who might not know that it was void.
Sim. & St. 179, 57 Eng. Rep. 313 (1824), it was held that the devises did not vest
because of breaches of conditions precedent. The validity of the conditions was assumed,
for the courts were aware that if personalty had been involved and the civil-law rules
had been applicable, the conditions would have been void (in the absence of gifts
over). Long v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052, 98 Eng. Rep. 69 (1767), a King's Bench
case, involved a devise upon a consent-to-marry condition. Lord Mansfield stated that
it was a condition precedent and must have been performed before the devisee could
take; but the court found that the condition had not been breached. Strangely enough,
Lord Mansfield, in a dictum at 2055, stated that if the condition had been subsequent,
it would have been void under the in terrorem doctrine. This is the only case in which
that doctrine was recognized as being applicable to devises of real estate.
See discussions in the following chancery cases relative to the attitude of the
common-law judges to consent-to-marry conditions: Hervey v. Aston, West T. Hard.
350 at 391, 426, 25 Eng. Rep. 975 (1737); Scott v. Tyler, Dick. 712 at 721, 21
Eng. Rep. 448 (1788); Rhenish v. Martin, I Wils. K. B. 130 at 132, 95 Eng. Rep.
532 (1746); Pulling v. Ready, 1 Wils. K. B. 21, 95 Eng. Rep. 469 (1743).
66
Williams v. Fry, I Mod. 86, 86 Eng. Rep. 7sz (1670); Rhenish v. Martin,
I Wils. K. B. 130 at 132, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746). See also cases cited in the preceding note.
67
Scott v. Tyler, Dick. 712 at 722, 21 Eng. Rep. 448 (1788); Hervey v.
Aston, West T. Hard. 350 at 424, 25 Eng. Rep. 975 (1737).
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But if a gift over were added, it was felt necessary to conclude that the
testator meant what he said, and the condition was enforced.68 A testator's real intention was, of course, never sought; and the violence of
the presumption led some to say that the court was merely applying the
civil-law rule in dealing with legacies except in those cases when to do
so would defeat the interest of the legatee over.69 Actually the presumption about the testator's intention was merely a device to preserve
some semblance of consistency between cases where the common-law
and cases where the civil-law rules were applied.
It is not to be thought that this fantastic rule was ever recognized
as a satisfactory solution of the conflict over the legality of consentto-marry conditions. Several cryptic comments were dropped by early
judges who, nevertheless, did not find that their views warranted
68 See discussions in the following cases as to the origin of the in te"orem doctrine:
Re Dickson, l Sim. (N. S.) 37 at 43, 61 Eng. Rep. 14 (1850); Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. 89 at 97, 30 Eng. Rep. 909 (1796); Keily v. Monck, 3 Ridg. Par!. Rep.
(Ire.) 205 at 247 (1795); Scott v. Tyler, Dick. 712 at 718, 21 Eng. Rep. 448
- (1788); Reynish v. Martin, 3 Atlc. 330, 26 Eng. Rep. 991 (1746); Hicks v. Pendarvis, 2 Freem. Ch. 41, 22 Eng. Rep. 1046 (1678); Clarke v. Parker, 19 Ves. Jun.
l at 14, 34 Eng. Rep. 419 (1812); Williams v. Fry, l Mod. 86 at 88, 86 Eng. Rep.
752 (1671); Pulling v. Ready, 1 Wils. K. B. 21, 95 Eng. Rep. 469 (1743). The
opinions of the judges and the lengthy briefs of counsel in Hervey v. Aston, West T.
Hard. 350, 25 Eng. Rep. 975 (1737), are illuminating in this connection. See also
2 SWINBURNE, WILLS, 7th ed., 483, note (1803).
The following cases expressly applied the doctrine: Bellasis v. Ermine, l Ch.
Cas. 22, 22 Eng. Rep. 674 (1663); Hicks v. Pendarvis, supra; Reynish v. Martin,
supra; Semphill v. Bayly, Pree. Ch. 562, 24 Eng. Rep. 252 (1721); Underwood v.
Morris, 2 Atk. 184, 26 Eng. Rep. 515 (1741); Wheeler v. Bingham, 1 Wils. K. B.
135, 95 Eng. Rep. 535 (1746); Anonymous (Case 6), l Freem. Ch. 302, 22 Eng.
Rep. 1224 (1673). The following cases seem to go on that basis although it was not
expressly so stated: Cocke! v. Phipps, Dick. 391, 21 Eng. Rep. 321 (1766); Fleming
v. Walgrave, 1 Ch. Cas. 57, 22 Eng. Rep. 693 (1664); Norwood v. Norwood, 1 Ch.
Rep. 121, 21 Eng. Rep. 525 (1637). In the following cases the doctrine was not
applied because of the presence of gifts over: Amos v. Horner, 1 Eq. Cas. Ahr. II3,
21 Eng. Rep. 920 (1699); Channey v. Graydon, 2 Atk. 616, 26 Eng. Rep. 768
(1743); Lloyd v. Branton, 3 Mer. 108, 36 Eng. Rep. 42 (1817); Malcolm v.
O'Callaghan, 2 Madd. 349, 56 Eng. Rep. 363 (1817); Stratton v. Grymes, 2 Vern.
357, 23 Eng. Rep. 825 (1698). The doctrine was approved in a dictum by Lord
Mansfield in Long v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052 at 2055, 98 Eng. Rep. 69 (1767).
69 Wheeler v. Bingham, I Wils. K. B. 135 at 137, 95 Eng. Rep. 535 (1746);
Keily v. Monck, 3 Ridg. Parl. Rep. (Ire.) 205 at 249 (1795); Hicks v. Pendarvis,
2 Freem. Ch. 41, 22 Eng. Rep. 1046 (1678); Lloyd v. Branton, 3 Mer. 108 at II7:
36 Eng. Rep. 42 (1817); Cleaver v. Spurling, 2 P. Wms. 526 at 528, 24 Eng. Rep.
846 (1729). In Long v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052, 98 Eng. Rep. 69 (1767), the will
contained a statement that the condition was not intended, nor should be construed,
to be in te"orem. This was construed, in a dictum by Lord Mansfield at 2055, to make
the condition "doubly in terrorem."
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overthrowing the precedents. 70 Limitations, however, were placed upon
the doctrine. It did not apply, of course, to devises.11 In a number of
cases it was held inapplicable to conditions precedent.12 This result was
probably reached by an application of the common-law principle that
a condition precedent must be performed if the beneficiary is to take,
regardless of the validity of the condition,78 and probably was adopted
in cases involving legacies as a means to escape from the in terrorem
doctrine. In two cases the doctrine was repudiated. 74
The vicious nature of the rule, apart from its irrationality, is that,
being a rule of construction on its face, it can find its way into cases
not involving marriage restraints. This has, in fact, happened. More
attention has been paid to it by the American courts in dealing with
conditions restraining the contest of wills than in marriage restraint
cases. 111
The activity in England over the in terrorem doctrine occurred in
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. There have been no cases
which applied it since the beginning of the nineteenth century. Four
cases since then, however, have recognized it as applicable under proper
70 "I do not find it was ever seriously supposed to have been the testator's intention to hold out the terror of that which he never meant should happen." Scott v.
Tyler, Dick. 712 at 718-719, 21 Eng. Rep. 448 (1788).
" ••• a clause can carry very little terror which is judged to be of no effect."
Lord Mansfield in Long v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052 at 2055, 98 Eng. Rep. 69 (1767).
" ••• It [the in terrorem doctrine] is one of the points, that occurred to the Judges
sitting here to deliver them from the difficulty arising from the rule of the civil law,
adopted without seeing the ground and the reason of applying it to this country under
different circumstances." Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. 89 at 98, 30 Eng. Rep. 909
(1796).
" ••• The old notion of the condition of consent being annexed in terrorem
only where there is not a bequest over seems not reconcilable to any sound principle
of Equity." Keily v. Monck, 3 Ridg. Parl. Rep. 205 at 247 (1795).
71 The cases cited in notes 65 and 66, supra, may be cited for this proposition.
72 Scott v. Tyler, Dick. 712, 21 Eng. Rep. 448 (1788); Creagh v. Wilson, 2
Vern. 572, 23 Eng. Rep. 972 (1706); Hervey v. Aston, West T. Hard. 350, 25
Eng. Rep. 975 (1737); Hemmings v. Munkley, I Bro. C. C. 303, 28 Eng. Rep.
1147 (1783); Knight v. Cameron, 14 Ves. Jun. 389, 33 Eng. Rep. 570 (1807);
Long v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052, 98 Eng. Rep. 69 (1767). This proposition was denied
in In re Nourse, [1899] I Ch. 63 at 69.
73
Seep. 1300, supra.
H Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. 89, 30 Eng. Rep. 909 (1796); Clifford v.
Beaumont, 4 Russ. 325, 38 Eng. Rep. 828 (1828).
5
' Browder, "Testamentary Conditions Against Contest," 36 M1cH. L. REv.
1066 at 1092 et seq. (1938).
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circumstances. 76 It is doubtful what attitude would be taken toward it
today.
D. Conclusion
Can it be said, upon the basis of the above considerations, that
conditions in restraint of marriage are illegal in England? The conflicts in the cases at many points make conclusions insecure. The courts
are not unaware of these conflicts. One court went so far as to say,
"The authorities stand so well ranged, that the Court would not
appear to act too boldly, whichever side of the proposition they
should adopt.•••" 11
Keeping this appraisal of the cases in mind, some conclusions may be
ventured.
Legality seems to be the rule, in fact; illegality the exception.
Little heed should be paid to the frequent lip-service to the rule that
all conditions in general restraint of marriage are illegal. Partial restraints are legal, except in rare cases where in operation the restraint
is general, and excluding the e:ffect of the in terrorem doctrine, which
is not founded upon public policy. General restraints in the form of
limitations, rather than conditions, are valid. It can be expected, upon
occasion, that general restraints in the form of conditions will be construed to be valid limitations. Marriage restraints in the form of conditions precedent are operative to defeat the estate given unless they are
observed, whether they are legal or illegal. General restraints upon
widows or widowers are valid. General restraints in the form of conditions subsequent upon single persons are subject to two conflicting
rules. Under one, the condition is illegal; but it is doubtful whether
this rule applies to devises of real estate, and it is likely to be supplanted entirely by the second rule, under which the most tecent cases
have been decided. Under the second rule, applicable to both legacies
and devises, the condition is valid if the testator did not intend to restrain marriage. It would seem, moreover, that there is almost a presumption in such a case that the testator did not so intend. Even where
he did, if his motive was the protection of the interests of his children,
the condition may be upheld. In short, assuming that a condition will
be construed to be a condition and that an intention to restrain will be
76 Re Dickson, I Sim. (N. S.) 37, 61 Eng. Rep. 14 (1850); Duddy v. Gresham,
39 L. T. 48 (1878); In re Nourse, [1899] I Ch. 63; In re Hanlon, [1933] Ch.
254.
77 Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. 89 at 98, 30 Eng. Rep. 909 (1796).
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found only where the evidence warrants it, no condition in general
restraint of marriage will be illegal unless it is imposed upon a single
person, is in the form of a condition subsequent, and perhaps not then
unless the testator intended to restrain marriage.

II
THE AMERICAN CASES

The influence of the English law in the American cases is unmistakable. Constant reference is made to the English cases themselves, and
the rules applied bear too close a resemblance to their English counterparts to be mere coincidence. A striking feature of the American cases
is the scarcity of any independent analyses of the problem.
It is unnecessary to remind anyone who is familiar with the complexities of the English rules that if an American court undertook to
make much use of the English precedents, it would have to tread cautiously through the maze. 78 The English cases can be used to advantage
only after rather thorough analysis. It is equally obvious that few
courts are in a position to afford such an analysis. One approaches the
American cases, therefore, with misgivings. If any consistency can be
found in the English cases, it is in their resistance to the civil-law rules
and in their ingenious efforts to depart from them. But no partial
analysis will reveal this tendency. The American courts, often without
the benefit of an independent attitude toward restraints of marriage,
have in many cases taken whatever English precedents were most
convenient, and have reached unsatisfactory results.
The crying need today is for a re-examination of the problem upon
principle, to ascertain just what the public interest in this country
demands.
In undertaking a study of the American rules, one is faced at the
outset with the existence of hundreds of cases involving marriage conditions and limitations about which no question of legality was raised.
In all of them decisions were reached or statements made which took
the legality of the conditions or limitations for granted. Most of these
cases involved limitations to widows so long as they remained widows,
or the equivalent; but many involved conditions against the remarriage of widows and even conditions and limitations upon gifts to single
78
In Mann v. Jackson, 84 Me. 400 at 403, 24 A. 886 (1892), the court said,
"The more we read, unless we are very careful to distinguish, the more we shall be
confounded."
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persons. These cases must be accorded some weight, at least in jurisdictions where the legality of marriage restraints has not yet been passed
upon. It would be impracticable to cite them all in this article; 79 but
one should take note of their existence; and in those states which do
not have cases dealing expressly with the marriage-restraint problem,
one should consider their possible effect before concluding that the
question is still open.

A. General Restraints
The American decisions upon conditions in general restraint of
marriage are as inconclusive as the English. The categorical statement
often made that such conditions are illegal 80 is not warranted.
Several unqualified decisions holding the conditions illegal have,
however, been made. 81 Two of these cases cannot now be accorded much
weight, since other decisions in those jurisdictions have taken a different turn. 82 A condition was struck out in a Kentucky case, but the court
in an abstract opinion gave no explanation of the reason why. 88 Only in
one state, Missouri, has any assessment been taken of the public interest which demands this result. In the leading case in that state,
Williams v. Cowden,84 the court declared,
79 The following cases are only representative: Gifts to widows upon limitation-Wiltfang v. Dirksen, 295 Ill. 362, 129 N. E. 159 (1920); In re Schriever's Estate,
221 N. Y. 268, u6 N. E. 995 {1917); Inman v. Inman, 125 N. J. Eq. 160, 4 A.
(2d) 1 (1938); Kidd's Estate, 293 Pa. 21, 141 A. 644 (1928); Haab v. Schneeberger, 147 Mich. 583, III N. W. 185 (1907). Gifts to widows upon condition-Vaughn v. Converse, 184 Iowa 891, 169 N. W. 144 (1918); Hutter v. Crawford,
225 Ky. 215, 7 S. W. {2d) 1043 (1928); Cummings v. Lohr, 246 Ill. 577, 92
N. E. 970 (1910); Ostrander v. Muskegon Finance Co., 230 Mich. 310, 202 N. W.
951 (1925); Fidelity Trust Co. v. Bobloski, 228 Pa. 52, 76 A. 720 (1910). Gifts
to single persons upon limitation--Miller v. Wall, 216 Ala. 448, II3 So. 501 (1926);
Furbee v. Furbee, 49 W. Va. 191, 38 S. E. SIi (1901); Thornquist v. Oglethorpe
Lodge, 140 Ga. 297, 78 S. E. 1086 (1913). Gifts to single persons upon condition:
Denfield, Petitioner, 156 Mass. 265, 30 N. E. 1018 (1892); Fawver v. Fawver, 6
Grat. (47 Va.) 236 (1849).
80 See cases and texts cited in note 8, supra, for representative statements.
81 Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266 (1883); Williams v. Cowden, 13 Mo.
2II (1850); Knost v. Knost, 229 Mo. 170, 129 S. W. 665 (1910); Sullivan v.
Garesche, 229 Mo. 496, 129 S. W. 949 (1910); In re Catlin, 97 Misc. 223, 160
N. Y. S. 1034 (1916); Middleton v. Rice, 4 Clark {Pa.) 7 {1845); Goffe v. Goffe,
37 R. I. 542, 94A. 2 (1915).
82
Cf. Robinson v. Martin, 200 N. Y. 159, 93 N. E. 488 (1910), infra at note
94, with In re Catlin, 97 Misc. 223, 160 N. Y. S. 1034 (1916); and cf. Commonwealth v. Stauffer, IO Pa. 350 (1849), infra, p. 1310, with Middleton v. Rice, 4 Clark
(Pa.) 7 (1845).
88
Shelby County Trust Co. v. Howell, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 30 ( 1894).
8
' 13 Mo. 2II at 213 (1850).
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"Upon the general proposition, the preservation of domestic
happiness, the security of private virtue, and the rearing of
families in habits of sound morality and filial obedience and
reverence, are deemed to be objects too important to society, to
be weighed in the scale against individual or personal will. In
this case, it need scarcely be more specifically intimated, that the
clause in question, however well intended, virtually presented
and held up a continued reward for that species of immorality
to avert which the institution of marriage was so divinely ordained and has been so wisely upheld."
More recent decisions in that state have followed this decision.85
It is interesting to compare the above quotation with a statement
made in an early :Virginia case, Maddox v. Maddox's Administrator.88
The decision there was not upon the legality of general restraints, but
the language quoted below was uttered by way of dictum.
"It will not be questioned that marriages of a suitable and
proper character, founded on the mutual affection of the parties,
and made upon free choice, are of the greatest importance to the
best interests of society, and should be by all proper means promoted and encouraged. The purity of the marriage relation and
the happiness of the parties will, to a great extent, depend upon
their suitableness the one for the other, and the entire freedom of
choice which has led to their union; and upon these, in their turn,
in a great degree must depend the successful rearing of their
children, and the proper formation and development of their
character and principles. Hence not only should all positive prohibitions of marriage be rendered nugatory, but all unjust and
improper restrictions upon it should be removed, and all undue
influence in determining the choice of the parties should be carefully suppressed."
Along with these cases must be considered others which have subjected the rule against general restraints to qualifications or have rejected it altogether.
It was inevitable that the in terrorem doctrine would come into
the American law. It recommends itself too well to courts who wish
to avoid or postpone consideration of the trying problem of legality of
marriage restraints. It has, in fact, been applied in this country as freH Knost v. Knost, 229 Mo. 170, 129 S. W. 665 (1910); Sullivan v. Garesche,
229 Mo. 496, 129 S. W. 949 (1910).
88 II Grat. (52 Va.) 804 at 806-807 (1854).
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quently as in England, usually in cases involving general restraints.
The extension of the doctrine in this country will not receive separate
or extended treatment here. It will suffice merely to refer to it where
it has intruded to confuse the issues of the problem under discussion.
Accordingly, attention must be called to decisions in several states
in which the in terrorem doctrine has been applied in cases involving
general restraints where the testators provided no gifts over to take
effect upon breach of the conditions. 87 In one case the doctrine was
applied strictly as a rule of construction, the absence of a gift over
showing, in the court's belief, an intention that no forfeiture should
occur. 88 Similarly, in dicta in two other cases the courts merely declared that the condition is valid if there is a gift over, but invalid if
not. 89 Some American courts, however, have associated the words "in
terrorem" with the illegality of a condition, and have used the words
merely to designate an illegal condition without any thought of the
technical aspects of the doctrine.90 Others, with something of the same
idea in mind, and yet perceiving the significance of the gift over in the
connotation of the term as used in the English cases, have declared
that general restraints are illegal, subject, however, to the exception
that even an illegal condition cannot be relieved against if there is a
gift over to another upon breach.91 It is not observed by any of the
American courts that the doctrine was not applied by the English courts
to general restraints. This exception to the rule against general restraints is a very material limitation upon it; in more cases than not,
gifts over will be found.
A more significant qualification of the rule against general restraint
conditions is the acceptance by some courts of the principle, discussed
above in connection with µie English cases, that the condition is not
87 Randall v. Marble, 69 Me. 310 (1879) (deed); Otis v. Prince, IO Gray
(76 Mass.) 581 (1858); Gard v. Mason, 169 N._ C. 507, 86 S. E. 3oz (1915)
(deed); Cook's Estate, 3 Phila. 60 (1858). The beneficiaries in these cases were
single persons. The application of the in terrorem doctrine to conditions against the
remarriage of widows is considered below at pp. 1312-1313.
88
Randall v. Marble, 69 Me. 310 (1879) (deed).
89
Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. z66 at z75 (1883); Chapin v. Cooke, 73
Conn. 7z at 78, 46 A. z8z (1900).
90
Bennett v. Packer, 70 Conn. 357, 39 A. 739 (1898); Holmes v. Field, lZ
Ill. 4z4 (1851); Harmon v. Brown, 58 Ind. zo7 (1877); Anderson v. Crawford,
zoz Iowa zo7, zo7 N. W. 571 (19z6).
91
Otis v. Prince, IO Gray (76 Mass.) 581 (1858); In re Miller's Will, 159
N. C. 1z3, 74 S. E. 888 (191z); Gard v. Mason, 169 N. C. 507, 86 S. E. 3oz
(1915) (deed); Griffin v. Doggett, 199 N. C. 706, 155 S. E. 605 (1930); Cook's
Estate, 3 Phila. 60 (1858). Cf. Selden v. Keen, z7 Grat. (68 Va.) 576 (1876).
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illegal if the testator did not intend to restrain marriage. 92 In one of
these cases the court took the interesting position that the omission of a
gift over showed the absence of an intention to restrain marriage/18
Another unusual position was taken in the New York case, Robinson
v. Martin, 94 involving a gift to the testatrix's "unmarried daughters."
The court said that no condition was involved and that there was
no evidence of any intention to restrain marriage. The testatrix merely
made a distinction, it was said, between her daughters as conditions
existed at the time the gift took effect; and, no intention to restrain
being present, no attention was to be paid to the possible effect of the
gift upon the daughters' conduct.
Several Pennsylvania cases have held that the rule against marriage restraints has no application where devises of real estate are
involved,95 following the English decision, Jones v. Jones. 96
A few courts, by way of dicta, have asserted that a condition precedent will prevent vesting of a gift unless observed, whether the condition is illegal or not. 97 This position is discussed at more length
below.98
Last in order in this survey of general restraints are those cases in
which the courts have declared that conditions in general restraint of
marriage are not illegal.
In two cases the position was taken that a condition against marriage imposes no obligation upon the beneficiary, such as in a contract
not to marry, and since the beneficiary is left free to do as he pleases,
Mann v. Jackson, 84 Me. 400, 24 A. 886 (1892); Harlow v. Bailey, 189
Mass. 208, 75 N. E. 259 (1905); Graydon's Exrs. v. Graydon, 23 N. J. Eq. 229
(1872); Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Armstrong, 70 N. J. Eq. 572, 62 A.
456 (1905); Robinson v. Martin, 200 N. Y. 159, 93 N. E. 488 (1910); Holbrook's
Estate, 213 Pa. 93, 62 A. 368 (1905); Selden v. Keen, 27 Grat. (68 Va.) 5i6
(1876). In Meek v. Fox, n8 Va. 774, 88 S. E. 161 (1916), the condition was declared void, but the court indicated that the decision would have been otherwise if the
testator had not intended to restrain marriage. The court declared that there is a
presumption that one using a condition in restraint of marriage intends to restrain
marriage, and the burden is upon the one who asserts the contrary to prove it.
93
Selden v. Keen, 27 Grat. (68 Va.) 576 (1876).
94
200 N. Y. 159, 93 N. E. 488 (1910).
95
McCullough's Appeal, 12 Pa. 197 (1849); Cornell v. Lovett's Exr., 35 Pa.
100 (1860); Lancaster v. Flowers, 9 Pa. Dist. 241 (1900).
96
1 Q. B. Div. 279 (1876). See supra, at note 48.
97
Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266 (1883); Phillips v. Ferguson, 85 Va.
509, 8 S. E. 241 (1888); Maddox v. Maddox's Admr., n Grat. (52 Va.) 804
(1854).
98
See discussion of the effect of illegality at p. 1331 ff., infra.
92
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the policy against restrictions upon marriage cannot be violated.99 In
the words of one court,
''but a gift on condition not to marry leaves the donee free as air
to do anything, at pleasure, but to divert it to uses for which it
was not intended." 100
In the case just quoted from, Commonwealth v. Stauffer, the court
did not confine its position to the proposition quoted, but declared that
public policy does not require the nullifiC?.tion of conditions in restraint
of marriage. This is one of the leading cases, and one of the earliest,
and has been referred to many times, usually however, as standing for
the validity of conditions against the remarriage of widows. The case
did involve a remarriage condition, but the court did not place its decision upon any distinction between such conditions and others; and
the case must be taken to stand for the proposition that no condition
should be defeated because it is restrictive of marriage. In this case is
to be found one of the few inquiries that have been made in this country into the origin of the marriage-restraints rules. The court perceived that those rules were of Roman origin and found them to be
unnecessary in modern society. It must have taken some imagination
for a court in I 849 to declare that overpopulation might become as
great an evil in this country as depopulation was in ancient Rome. No
moral principle was discussed, and apparently none was perceived. The
in terrorem doctrine was not mentioned, the condition-limitation distinction was repudiated; hence the decision rests upon policy considerations alone.101
B. Conditions Against Remarriage
The largest part of the American cases deal with conditions against
remarriage, usually of widows, sometimes of widowers. Apart from the
effect of several statutes, there is more agreement here than elsewhere.
These conditions have been generally upheld,102 the only significant
99

Chapin v. Cooke, 73 Conn. 72, 46 A. 282 (1900); Commonwealth v. StaufPa. 350 (1849).
10
°Commonwealth v. Stauffer, IO Pa. 350 at 355 (1849).
101
This decision was followed in McCullough's Appeal, I 2 Pa. 197 ( I 849).
Dictum,in Holbrook's Estate, 213 Pa. 93 at 95, 62 A. 368 (1905), recommends the
complete abandonment of any marriage restraint prohibition.
102
Vaughn v. Lovejoy, 34 Ala. 437 (1859); Helm v. Leggett, 66 Ark. 23, 48
S. W. 675 (1898); Jones v. Jones, I Colo. App. 28, 27 P. 85 (1891); Chapin v.
Cooke, 73 Conn. 72, 46 A. 282 (1900); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Houlehan, 15
Del. Ch. 84, 131 A. 529 (1925); McGinnis v. Foster, 4 Ga. 377 (1848); Snider
fer,
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divergence being in the application of the in terrorem doctrine. The
position generally taken is that any policy against marriage restraints,
if it exists, does not extend to the second marriage. Several reasons
have been given for this. Some courts have spoken of a husband's having an interest in his wife's viduity; 108 but the nature of such an
unusual interest is not explained. One court declared that "widows
are praiseworthy that content themselves with one husband, as being
a pattern of chastity and modesty." 104 In a recent case, the court said,

"If there be any element of public policy involved in such an
imagined instance, it is against the encouragement of the marriage
of a widow and another who would be affected by the circumstances of an imminent loss of the property." 105
This would make a forceful argument for the support of any kind of
marriage condition. A somewhat different justification was offered
bluntly in Commonwealth v. Stauffer,1° 6
"It would be extremely difficult to say, why a husband should
not be at liberty to leave a homestead to his wife, without being
compelled to let her share it with a sucessor to his bed, and to use
it as a nest to hatch a brood of strangers to his blood."
The interests of a testator's children, and the likelihood that they
might not be so well cared for after their mother's remarriage, have
been influential factors in upholding conditions of this type; but
v. Newsom, 24 Ga. 139 (1858); Glass v. Johnson, 297 Ill. 149, 130 N. E. 473
(1921); Gough v. Gough, 26 Md. 347 (1866); Bostick v. Blades, 59 Md. 231
(1882); Walsh v. Mathews, I I Mo. 13 I (1847); Durney v. Schoeffier, 24 Mo. 170
(1857); Wise v. Crandall, (Mo. 1919) 215 S. W. 245; In re Johnson's Estate, 133
Misc. 566, 233 N. Y. S. 414 (1929); Bryan v. Harper, 177 N. C. 308, 98 S. E.
822 (1919); Commonwealth v. Stauffer, IO Pa. 350 (1849); Langfeld's Estate, 4
Pa. Co. Ct. 82 (1886); Duncan v. Philips, 40 Tenn. 415 (1859); Wooten v. House,
{Tenn. Ch. App. 1895) 36 S. W. 932; Herd v. Catron, 97 Tenn. 662, 37 S. W.
551 (1896); Overton v. Lea, 108 Tenn. 505, 68 S. W. 250 (1902); Littler v.
Dielmann, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 392, 106 S. W. II37 (1908); Foote v. Foote, (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934) 76 S. W. (2d) 194. In the following cases the same rule was applied
to conditions in deeds: Nunn v. Justice, 278 Ky. 811, 129 S. W. (2d) 564 (1939);
Nations v. Spence, (Mo. 1921) 235 S. W. 1064; Stauffer v. Kessler, 81 Ind. App.
436, 130 N. E. 651 (1924). The rule applicable to wills was also applied to a contract against marriage in Appleby v. Appleby, 100 Minn. 408, I I I N. W. 305
(1907).
108
Vaughn v. Lovejoy, 34 Ala. 437 (1859); Wilmington Trust Co. v. Houlehan,
15 Del. Ch. 84, 131 A. 529 (1925).
10
"' Durney v. Schoeffier, 24 Mo. 170 at 173 (1857).
105
Foote v. Foote, (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) 76 S. W. (2d) 194 at 197.
106
IO Pa. 350 at 355 (1849).
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there is nothing to indicate that the rule depends upon the presence
of children. Probably in this country, as in England, the position was
taken because of the absence of authority for invalidating marriage
conditions when applied to widows.
In several cases the distinction between restraints upon the marriage of single persons and of widows was repudiated and the remarriage conditions were held void. 101 In one case the court refused to
enforce the condition, without giving reasons.108 In another case the
court based its decision in part upon the fact that the condition was
imposed upon one not the testator's widow.100 This is the only case in
which such a distinction has been made.110 If a remarriage condition is
to be sustained merely because of the interests of a widow's children,
this distinction may have some basis. Of course, it might be argued that
a testator who was not the husband of the beneficiary might justifiably
wish to benefit the latter only if the interests of her children were not
sacrificed thereby. At any rate, the general belief is that there never
has been any objection to restraining the second marriage. In this view,
it is of no consequence that the testator and beneficiary are not husband
and wife.
Statutory limitations upon the use of restraints upon marriage are
discussed below.111
In a number of cases the influence of the in terrorem doctrine can
be observed. In several of these cases the distinction between widows
and single persons was ignored and the condition found to be illegal,
with the admission, however, that an exception would be made if a
gift over were present.113 This parallels the treatment given the doc107 Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266 (1883); Kennedy v. Alexander, 21 App.
D. C. 424 (1903); Binnerman v. Weaver, 8 Md. 517 (1855); Waters v. Tazewell,
9 Md. 291 (1856), involving a condition in a deed; Middleton v. Rice, 4 Clark
(Pa.) 7 (1845); Stroud v. Bailey, 3 Grant's Cases (Pa.) 310 (1861).
108 Shelby Trust Co. v. Howell, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 30 (1894).
109 Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266 (1883).
110 In the following cases such conditions were upheld: Anderson v. Crawford,
202 Iowa 207, 207 N. W. 571 (1926); Wise v. Crandall, (Mo. 1919) 215 S. W.
245; Herd v. Catron, 97 Tenn. 662, 37 S. W. 551 (1896); Overton v. Lea, 108
Tenn. 505, 68 S. W. 250 (1902); Nunn v. Justice, 278 Ky. Sn, 129 S. W. (2d)
564 (1939); Stauffer v. Kessler, 81 Ind. App. 436, 130 N. E. 651 (1924). In the
English case, Newton v. Marsden, 2 J. & H. 356, 70 Eng. Rep. 1094 (1862), the
matter was discussed at some length and the court concluded that the condition should
be valid even though the beneficiary was not the testator's widow.
111 P. 1319 ff., infra.
112 Kennedy v. Alexander, 21 App. D. C. 424 (1903); Binnerman v. Weaver, 8
Md. 517 (1855); Waters v. Tazewell, 9 Md. 291 (1856) (deed); Stroud v. Bailey,
3 Grant's Cases (Pa.) 310 (1861).
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trine as applied to general restraints upon single persons, noted in the
section above. Similarly, three other cases took no position with reference to the remarriage condition other than to hold that the condition
could not be enforced in the absence of a gift over.118 In a number of
cases the condition was enforced, but the in terrorem doctrine was
recognized, several of the courts declaring that the decision would
have been otherwise if there had been no gift over,114 and others referring to the presence of gifts over as one ground for upholding the
conditions in the particular cases. m

C. The Condition-Limitation Distinction
By the great preponderance of American authority, the distinction
between conditions and limitations has been adopted, to the end, of
course, that limitations of estates until marriage are valid, with respect
to both widows and single persons.116 It has been said that no clause in
118 Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 (1810); M'llvaine v. Gethen, 3 Whart.
(Pa.) 575 {1838); Hoopes v. Dundas, IO Pa. 75 {1849).
114 Pringle v. Dunkley, 22 Miss. 16 {1850); Mickey's Appeal, 46 Pa. 337
{1863); Estate of Hough, 13 Phila. 279 (1879); Kromer Estate, 22 Pa. Co. Ct.
327 (1899); Estate of Griffiths, I Lack. Leg. N. (Pa.) 311 {1895); McCloskey v.
Gleason, 56 Vt. 264 {1883).
115
Wilmington Trust Co. v. Houlehan, I 5 Del. Ch. 84, 131 A. 5 29 ( I 92 5) ;
Snider v. Newsom, 24 Ga. 139 {1858); Gough v. Gough, 26 Md. 347 {1866);
Cornell v. Lovett's Exr., 35 Pa. 100 (1860); Langfeld's Estate, 4 Pa. Co. Ct. 84
{1886); Hughes v. Boyd, 34 Tenn. 5n (1855). In Crawford v. Thompson, 91
Ind. 266 {1883), the absence of a gift over was offered as one ground for holding
the condition void.
116
Vaughan v. Lovejoy, 34 Ala. 437 (1859); Bradford v. Culbreth, (Del. 1939)
IO A. (2d) 534; Doyal v. Smith, 28 Ga. 262 (1859); Logan v. Hammond, 155
Ga. 514, n7 S. E. 428 (1923); Bruce v. Fogarty, 53 Ga. App. 443, 186 S. E.
463 (1936); Harmon v. Brown, 58 Ind. 207 (1877); Tate v. McLain, 74 Ind. 493
{1881); O'Harrow v. Whitney, 85 Ind. 140 (1882); Hibbits v. Jack, 97 Ind. 570
(1884); Wood v. Beasley, 107 Ind. 37, 7 N. E. 331 (1886); Sims v. Gay, 109 Ind.
501, 9 N. E. 120 (1886); Summit v. Yount, 109 Ind. 506, 9 N. E. 582 {1886);
Beshore v. Lytle, 114 Ind. 8, 16 N. E. 499 (1887); Levengood v. Hoople, 124 Ind.
27, 24 N. E. 373 (1890); Nagle v. Hirsch, 59 Ind. App. 282, 108 N. E. 9 (1915);
Thompson v. Patten, 70 Ind. App. 490, 123 N. E. 705 (1917); Anderson v. Crawford, 202 Iowa 207, 207 N. W. 571 (1926); Vance v. Campbell's Heirs, 31 Ky.
229 (1833); Coppage v. Alexander's Heirs, 41 Ky. 313 (1842); Charles v. Shortridge, 277 Ky. 183, 126 S. W. (2d) 139 (1939); Arthur v. Cole, 56 Md. 100
(1880) (deed); Maddox v. Yoe, 121 Md. 288, 88 A. 225 (1913); Ijams v. Shapiro,
138 Md. 16, n3 A. 343 (1921); Fuller v. Wilbur, 170 Mass. 506, 49 N. E. 916
{18q8); Harlow v. Bailey, 189 Mass. 208, 75 N. E. 259 (1905); Ruggles v. Jewett,
213 Mass. 167, 99 N. E. 1092 (1912); Pringle v. Dunkley, 22 Miss. 16 (1850);
Winget v. Gay, 325 Mo. 368, 28 S. W. {2d) 999 (1930); Trenton Trust & Safe
Deposit Co. v. Armstrong, 70 N. J. Eq. 572, 62 A. 456 (1905); Irwin v. Irwin,
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a will is of more frequent occurrence than a provision for widows
during widowhood.117 The validity of the clauses has been so much
assumed that in a majority of cases where they have appeared no question of legality has been mentioned.118 In most cases where a problem of
legality was perceived, the courts accepted the distinction as a sufficient
basis for decision without going behind it to reason why. One suspects
that in many cases the distinction serves, like the in terrorem doctrine,
as a release from the embarrassing problem of legality. At the same
time, the idea persists that a limitation expresses a purpose merely to
provide for the beneficiary until marriage, and that therefore the distinction between a limitation and a condition is substantially related
to any determination of legality. A group of cases have expressly taken
this position. 110 The courts in another group of cases, however, have
declared that the distinction is purely technical and is irrelevant to any
policy determinations.120 It is the opinion of these courts that marriage
is as much restrained in the one case as in the other, and to hold otherwise would permit a testator to escape from the dictates of public policy
by a mere choice of words.121
179 App. Div. 871, 167 N. Y. S. 76 (1917); In re Horton's Will, 160 Misc. 64,
289 N. Y. S. 618 (1936); Bennett v. Robinson, IO Watts (Pa.) 348 (1840);
Kringle's Estate, I Phila. 443 (1852); Cooper v. Pogue, 92 Pa. 254 (1879); Bruch's
Estate, 185 Pa. 194, 39 A. 813 (1898); Cloud v. Calhoun, 10 Rich. Eq. (S. C.) 358
(1858); Hawkins v. Skeggs's Admr,, 29 Tenn. 31 (1848); Hughes v. Boyd, 34
Tenn. 5u (1855); Little v. Birdwell, 21 Tex. 597 (1858); Haring v. Shelton,
(Tex. Civ. App. 1908) II4 S. W. 389; Selden v. Keen, 27 Grat. (68 Va.) 576
(1876).
117
McGinnis v. Foster, 4 Ga. 377 at 379 (1848).
118
See note 79, supra.
119 Hibbits v. Jack, 97 Ind. 570 (1884); Arthur v. Cole, 56 Md. 100 (1880)
(deed); Maddox v. Yoe, 121 Md. 288, 88 A. 225 (1913); Ruggles v. Jewett, 213
Mass. 167, 99 N. E. 1092 (1912); Winget v. Gay, 325 Mo. 368, 28 S. W. (2d)
999 (1930); Trenton Trust & Safe Deposit Co. v. Armstrong, 70 N. J. Eq. 572,
62 A. 456 (1905); Irwin v. Irwin, 179 App. Div. 871, 167 N. Y. S. 76 (1917).
See dicta to the same effect in Mann v. Jackson, 84 Me. 400, 24 A. 886 at 888
(1892); Graydon's Exrs. v. Graydon, 23 N. J. Eq. 229 at 237 (1872).
120
Snider v. Newsom, 24 Ga. 139 (1858); Commonwealth v. Stauffer, IO Pa.
350 (1849); Langfeld's Estate, 4 Pa. Co. Ct. 82 (1886); Holbrook's Estate, 213
Pa. 93, 62 A. 368 ( 1905). The condition-limitation distinction was repudiated without comment in Durney v. Schoeffler, 24 Mo. 170 (1857); Herd v. Catron, 97 Tenn.
662, 37 S. W. 551 (1876); Wooten v. House, (Tenn. Ch. App. 1895) 36 S. W.
93 2 • 121
ln Langfeld's Estate, 4 Pa. Co. Ct. 82 at 84 (1886), the court said, "It is
mere casuistry to say that a gift is immoral which is to cease if the legatee marries, and
not immoral if it is to continue so long as she remains single, and a rule which is
founded upon such casuistry is itself immoral, because it is false."
In Commonwealth v. _Stauffier, IO Pa. 350 at 357 (1886), the court said,
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The issue presented by this difference of opinion might have been
fought out with some hope of an ultimate solution if the courts had
been meticulous in drawing the distinction between a condition and a
limitation.
Paralleling the construction tendencies in England, words appropriate to describe conditions have been construed to be limitations. In
some instances nothing is said to reveal whether such misconstructions
were deliberate or not. 122 In others the basis of the error is apparent.123
Since the use of a limitation is often thought to express a purpose not
to restrain marriage, but merely to give support until marriage, courts
have brought themselves to the point of seeking the intention first and
then attaching the label without regard to the form of the words. It is
said that the substance and not the form of the language must be
decisive. 124 It is certainly desirable that the legality of clauses be determined upon their substance and not their form. But it would have
been much better if these courts had gone the whole way and thrown
aside the condition-limitation distinction and looked solely to the differences in a testator's intention which the distinction is said to represent. The distinction, as normally used, is purely formal. Only confusion can be wrought by construing language normally importing a
condition to be a limitation because of the effect it was intended to
have upon the conduct of the beneficiary.
The nadir of chaos is reached in those cases where it has been held
that the presence of a gift over turns a condition into a limitation.125
This, too, probably can be explained. It probably goes back to Blackstone, who stated that a condition subsequent becomes a limitation
"But, whether the restraint be by limitation or condition, is, in a vast majority of
cases, the effect of accident, depending on the turn of expression habitual to the
scrivener, who seldom knows anything of the technical difference between them."
122 Bennett v. Packer, 70 Conn. 357, 39 A. 739 (1898); Nunn v. Justice, 278
Ky. 8u, 129 S. W. (2d) 564 (1939) (deed); Appleby v. Appleby, 100 Minn. 408,
I I I N. W. 305 (1907), involving a contract; Kromer Estate, 22 Pa. Co. Ct. 327
(1899).
128 Estate of Fitzgerald, 161 Cal. 319, II9 P. 96 (19u); Mann v. Jackson,
84 Me. 400, 24 A. 886 (1892); In re Miller's Will, 159 N. C. 123, 74 S. E. 888
(1912); Griffin v. Doggett, 199 N. C. 706, 155 S. E. 605 (1930); Schaeffer v.
Messersmith, IO Pa. Co. Ct. 366 (1890).
124 Schaeffer v. Messersmith, IO Pa. Co. Ct. 366 (1890).
125 Bennett v. Packer, 70 Conn. 357, 39 A. 739 (1898); Snider v. Newsom, 24
Ga. 139 (1858); Eastham v. Eastham, 191 Ky. 617, 231 S. W. 221 (1921); In re
Miller's Will, 159 N. C. 123, 74 S. E. 888 (1912); Griffin v. Doggett, 199 N. C.
706, 155 S. E. 605 (1930); Kromer Estate, 22 Pa. Co. Ct. 327 (1899).
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when it is followed by a gift over.1 u But the limitations Blackstone was
talking about were conditional limitations, i.e., executory interests,
which are to be distinguished from conditions subsequent by the presence of gifts over and by the absence of rights of re-entry for conditions broken. For the purposes of the present distinction, a conditional
limitation is a condition. The limitation spoken of in connection with
marriage restraints definitely is not a conditional limitation. This has
not been understood in the cases mentioned; hence the confusion.127
To bring the wheel full circle, a group of cases has appeared in
which limitations have been held to be conditions.1211 In a reverse application of the above principle, it has been held that the absence of a
gift over makes a condition of what would otherwise be a limitation.129
In one case the decision in effect seems to be a tacit repudiation of
the condition-limitation distinction and an attempt to bring both conditions and limitations within the ambit of the rule forbidding general
restraints of marriage.130 Most of these decisions, however, are based
upon the construction of a statute in Indiana, presumably passed in an
effort to settle one aspect of the marriage-restraint problem.181 This
statute is considered here because, in construing it, the courts have
turned the decisions upon an application of the condition-limitation
distinction. The Indiana statute provides,
"A devise or bequest to a wife with a condition in restraint of
marriage shall stand, but the condition shall be void." 132
It might be asked why conditions upon gifts to widows are singled
126 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 155 (1756). The court in Snider v. Newsom,
24 Ga. 139 (1858), referred expressly to this section in Blackstone. In Griffin v.
Doggett, 199 N. C. 706, 155 S. E. 605 (1930), the court referred to a similar
statement in 4 KENT, CoMMENTARIEs, 13th ed., 125, 126 (1884).
1 u Most of the courts which have reached this result have had the in terrorem
doctrine in mind, where the existence of a gift over is the controlling factor, and have
confused that doctrine with the condition-limitation distinction.
128 Kennedy v. Alexander, 21 App. D. C. 424 (1903); Spurgeon v. Scheible,
43 Ind. 216 (1873); Coon v. Bean, 69 Ind. 474 (1880); Stilwell v. Knapper, 69
Ind. 558 (1880); Beatty v. Irwin, 35 Ind. App. 238, 73 N. E. 926 (1904); Newton
v. Wyatt, 98 Ind. App. 177, 188 N. E. 697 (1934); Wise v. Crandall, (Mo. 1919)
215 S. W. 245; M'llvaine v. Gethen, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 575 (1838).
129 Kennedy v. Alexander, 21 App. D. C. 424 (1903).
180 M'llvaine v. Gethen, 3 Whart. (Pa.) 575! (1838).
131 Other statutory attempts at codification are treated together below at page
13 19, infra.
132 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1933), § 7-704.

1941]

RESTRAINTS ON MARRIAGE

out to be void; but more remarkable is the construction given to the
provision.
In several cases conditions were held void.188 In a considerable
number of cases gifts to widows during widowhood or so long as they
remained unmarried were held not to involve conditions, and so the
restrictions were not void under the statute.134 In startling contrast to
this position, it has been held that a gift to a widow during her life
"or widowhood," or for life "or so long as she remains unmarried,"
is a gift upon a void condition subsequent.185 It has been reasoned that
such a provision amounts to giving a widow a life estate and then
cutting it down in a manner forbidden by the statute. This would seem
to deal a final blow to any hopes that a rational solution of the marriage-restraint problem can be reached as long as the condition-limitation distinction is made. The words "for life or widowhood" differ
from the words "during widowhood" only in that the former more
expressly define the kind of estate which would normally be implied
from the latter. If it is urged that in the latter some sort of fee is
intended, the former can serve only to negative that intention. If the
one limits an estate and does not condition it, neither does the other.

D. Partial Restraints

In contrast to the situation in England, there are few American
cases dealing with partial restraints. It is usually taken for granted that
partial restraints are valid unless they are unreasonable. 186 Choice of
that term is unfortunate, since it may leave the impression that a
restriction may be defeated if it is harsh. Public policy should be the
only criterion, and a test of reasonableness should have reference only
to that. Wherever no policy is found against general restraints, presumably all partial restraints would be upheld.
133

Mack v. Mulcahy, 47 Ind. 68 (1874); Van Gorder v. Smith, 99 Ind. 404

(1885).
1 u Harmon v. Brown, 58 Ind. 207 (1877); Tate v. McLain, 74 Ind. 493
(1881); O'Harrow v. Whitney, 85 Ind. 140 (1882); Hibbits v. Jack, 97 Ind. 570
(1884); Wood v. Beasley, 107 Ind. 37, 7 N. E. 331 (1886); Sims v. Gay, 109 lnd.
501, 9 N. E. 120 (1886); Beshore v. Lytle, II4 Ind. 8, 16 N. E. 499 (1887);
Summit v. Yount, 109 Ind. 506, 9 N. E. 582 (1886); Levengood v. Hoople, 124
Ind. 27, 24 N. E. 373 (1890); Nagle v. Hirsch, 59 Ind. App. 282, 108 N. E. 9
(1915); Thompson v. Patten, 70 Ind. App. 490, 123 N. E. 705 (1917).
185
Spurgeon v. Scheible, 43 Ind. 216 (1873); Coon v. Bean, 69 Ind. 474
(1880); Stilwell v. Knapper, 69 Ind. 558 (1880); Beatty v. Irwin, 35 Ind. App. 238,
73 N. E. 926 (1904); Newton v. Wyatt, 98 Ind. App. 177, 188 N. E. 697 (1934).
186
It is so stated in practically all of the cases cited in this section.
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In two cases restrictions upon a beneficiary's marrying under twentyone were upheld. 187 In several cases conditions against marrying a particular person or into a particular class have been approved.138 Only
five cases have involved a condition restraining the marriage of a person
without the consent of some other person. In three of them it was
upheld; 189 but in one of the three, a New York case,140 the court declared that if personal property instead of real estate had been involved,
the in terrorem doctrine would have applied, since there was no gift
over. A similar statement was made in an early Illinois case involving
a condition against marrying under twenty-one. 141 In two other of the
cases cited in this paragraph the in terrorem doctrine was recognized,
but not applied, because the courts found it inapplicable to conditions
precedent.142 In one other the doctrine was repudiated.143 In the Illinois
case referred to,144 the condition, while valid, was not enforced against
the devisee because it was not brought to his attention, which the court
thought was necessary since he was the testator's heir.
In only three cases have partial restraints been held void. 145 In
Maddox v. Maddox's Administrator,146 the condition did not restrain
marriage as such, but enjoined the beneficiary always to remain a member of the Friends Society. She married a man who was not a member
of the society and ceased to be a member herself. The court found the
condition to be an unreasonable partial restraint, meaning that the
137 Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ill. 2u (1857); Reuff v. Coleman, 30 W. Va. 171,
3 S. E. 597 (1887).
188 Turner v. Evans, 134 Md. 238, 106 A. 617 (1919); Graydon's Exrs. v.
Graydon, 23 N. J. Eq. 229 (1872); Matter of Seaman, 218 N. Y. 77, ll2 N. E.
576 (1916); Osborne's Petition, 21 Pa. Dist. & Co. 293 (1934); Phillips v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 509, 8 S. E. 241 (1888). A dictum gives approval to such a condition
in In re Salomon's Estate, 156 Misc. 445, 281 N. Y. S. 837 (1935).
189
Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 129 Md. 455, 99 A. 672 (1916); Hogan v. Curtin,
88 N. Y. 162 (1882); United States Trust Co. v. Boes, 124 Misc. 48, 207 N.Y.S.
19 (1924).
140
Hogan v. Curtin, 88 N. Y. 162 (1882). Cf. Matter of Liberman, 279
N. Y. 458, 18 N. E. (2d) 658 (1939), infra at note 147, and Bayeaux v. Bayeaux,
8 Paige (N. Y.) 333 (1840), infra, note 148.
141
Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ill. 2ll (1857).
142
Phillips v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 509, 8 S. E. 241 (1888); Reuff v. Coleman, 30
W. Va. 171, 3 S. E. 597 (1887).
148
Pacholder v. Rosenheim, 129 Md. 455, 99 A. 672 (1916).
144
Shackelford v. Hall, 19 Ill. 2ll (1857).
145
Bayeaux v. Bayeaux, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 333 (1840); Matter of Liberman, 279
N. Y. 458, 18 NE. (2d) 658 (1939); Maddox v. Maddox's Admr., 11 Grat. (52
ya.) 804 (1854).
146
11 Grat. (52 Va.) 804 (1854).
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restriction was a virtual prohibition of marriage, since there were but
five or six marriageable members of the association. It was assumed,
of course, that if a woman marries a man not a member of the Friends
Society she will cease to be a member herself.
In Matter of Liberman,141 the most recent marriage-restraint case,
income from a trust fund was given to an adult son of the testator
during his life after his marriage with the consent of the testator's
executors and trustees. If the legatee married without consent, the
principal of the fund was to go to his brother and sister, who were
named trustees. The legatee sued to compel these trustees and legatees
over to give consent to a contemplated marriage. The court held that
the condition requiring consent was unreasonable and void. A criterion
of reasonableness was not suggested except such as can be taken from
the decision here that this condition was unreasonable, since the power
to give consent was vested in those persons to whom the property was to
be given if consent were withheld and the condition broken.
It should be of no concern to a court, as far as the marriage restraint
problem is concerned, that a testator has made it possible for one beneficiary to cheat another. If this decision is based upon the severity
or unfairness of the testator's provisions, it is open to criticism for confusing such an issue with the marriage-restraint problem. It is possible,
however, that in calling the condition unreasonable, the court meant
that it was practically a general restraint, because of the inducement
offered to the trustees to withhold consent.148

E. Statutory Treatment
In three states statutory treatment of the marriage-restraint problem has been attempted. The Indiana provision, discussed above,149
purports to forbid conditions against the remarriage of widows. The
courts, in construing it, have excluded limitations from its scope; however, it has been observed that they have drawn the distinction between limitations and conditions in a very irregular manner.
141

279 N. Y. 458, 18 N. E. (2d) 658 (1939).

148

In Bayeaux v. Bayeaux, 8 Paige (N. Y.) 333 (1840), a consent-to-marry

condition was declared illegal upon the same principle as that applied in the Liberman
case. A mother was given property from which she was to advance the best interests of
her children, except that if any child married without consent, he was to have nothing.
This was said to hold out an inducement to the mother to withhold consent.
149

Supra, at note 132 et seq.
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A section of the California Civil Code provides:
"Conditions imposing restraints upon marriage, except upon the
marriage of a minor, are void; but this does not affect limitations
where the intent was not to forbid marriage, but only to give the
use until marriage." 150
It is not clear from the language itself whether the conditionlimitation distinction is sanctioned or whether it was the purpose to
permit only limitations used without an intention to restrain marriage.
Literally construed, the statute forbids partial as well as general restraints, except conditions which forbid marriage during minority.
In Estate of Fitzgerald m the testator's estate was given to his
wife subject to the proviso that in the event of her remarriage, twothirds of her estate should go over to her son. Such language clearly
imposed a condition, but it was construed to be a limitation, following a
decision in another state which also misconstrued the condition-limitation distinction. The reason given for this construction was that no
intention to restrain marriage was found. By this interpretation of the
statute, any provision is valid, whether condition or limitation, if there
were no intention to restrain marriage; for if such intention is absent,
the provision will be called a limitation.
In Estate of Scott 152 all the testator's property was given to his
wife with the provision that if she should remarry, seventy-five per
cent of the estate should go to his children. This is similar to the case
above, but no inquiry into the testator's intep.tion was made. The court
either assumed that there was an intention to restrain marriage or else
construed the provision according to the normal import of the words;
for the language was found to impose a condition, which was held void.
An unusual construction was placed upon a condition against remarriage in Estate of Alexander.158 The court held that the condition
requiring the beneficiary to remain unmarried referred only to the time
of the testator's death, and was not operative after that. The court
added, however, that if the condition had been construed to apply after
the testator's death, it would have been void under the statute.

° Cal. Civ. Code

15

151
152

158

(Deering, 1937), § 710.
161 Cal. 319, II9 P. 96 (19II).
170 Cal. 65, 148 P. 221 (1915).
149 Cal. 146, 86 P. 308 (1906).
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Three sections of the Georgia Code are pertinent. One may be dismissed briefly. It provides:
"A condition in terrorem shall be void, unless there is a limitation over to some other person; in which case the latter shall
take." 1 H

If it is difficult to understand why courts perpetuate the in terrorem
doctrine, more puzzling is this effort to codify it. The section is open
to further criticism for not suggesting what a condition in terrorem is.
Many courts recognize that it has to do with marriage restraints. Others
have applied it to conditions against the contest of wills. Some courts
appear to think that the doctrine applies to any kind of condition as a
rule of construction whenever there is a gift over. This does not seem
to have been the intention in the above section. There are no cases
construing this section.
Two other sections of the Georgia Code deserve comment. One
provides,
"Marriage is encouraged by the law, and every effort to restrain or discourage marriage by contract, condition, limitation,
or otherwise, shall be invalid and void. Prohibiting marriage to
a particular person or persons, or before a certain reasonable age,
or other prudential provisions looking only to the interest of the
person to be benefited, and not in general restraint of marriage,
will be allowed and held valid." m
This section is not free of ambiguity. Partial restraints, clearly,
are to be permitted, or at least those relating to marriage with certain
persons or before a certain age, if the age is reasonable. The only other
partial restraint which has ever been imposed is that requiring consent
to marry. Presumably this, too, would be valid if it could be construed
as a prudential provision looking only to the interest of the beneficiary.
Such a condition can be used to impose practically a general restraint,
and under this section such a condition would probably be void.
Are all general restraints prohibited? Suppose a testator gives
property subject to a general marriage restraint, but intends merely to
provide for the support of the beneficiary while single. Would such an
arrangement be construed to be a permissible "prudential provision"?
The words "and not in general restraint of marriage" seem to confine
"prudential provisions" to partial restraints and exclude such a prom Ga. Code Ann. (1937), § II3-820.
m Ga. Code Ann. (1937), § 53-107.
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:vision :for support. On the other hand, the words "effort to restrain
or discourage marriage" might be construed to prohibit only those
restraints imposed with an intention to restrain, and thus authorize a
provision intended merely to provide support while single. The section
is to be commended for not codifying the condition-limitation distinction.
Another section of the Georgia Code provides,
"Limitations over upon the marriage of a widow shall be
valid, unless such limitations are manifestly intended to operate as
a restraint upon the free action of such widow in respect to marriage, and are not simply prudential provisions for the protection
of the interest of children or others in such event; in such cases
they are void." 166
Usually it is impossible to ascertain an intention to restrain or not
to restrain marriage from the language of the will itself. Perhaps those
provisions are illegal in which the testator expresses a desire to restrain
marriage. If no such intention is expressed, probably the gift over
would have to be examined to ascertain whether it is a prudential
provision for the donees over. It is difficult to know just what provisions could be brought within that term. Perhaps the donees would
need to be dependent in part at least upon the testator for support. In
Logan v. Hammond 151 a testator gave real estate to his wife so long
as she remained single. Applying the code section relative to widows,
the court declared that if the provision must be "manifestly intended"
to restrain marriage before it is illegal, the burden must be upon him
who asserts the restraint to prove that such an intention exists. Since this
burden was not borne here, the provision was upheld.

F. Conclusion
By way of summary, a few generalizations upon the legality of
marriage restraints are warranted. Beyond them is a welter of irreconcilable propositions which have been made the basis of decision in one
or more cases, none of which are sufficiently prevalent, however, to
justify more than a prediction that they may be followed in those
jurisdictions where they have already been applied and possibly in
other jurisdictions. It does not seem that any final judgment can be
m Ga. Code Ann. (1937), § 85-712.
m 155 Ga. 514, 117 S. E. 428 (1923).
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made now upon the question, "Are conditions ( or limitations) in restraint of marriage illegal?" Certainly no conclusive answer is available in so far as conditions in general restraint of marriage are concerned. It is generally conceded that the policy of the law is against
such provisions, but the qualifications which have been imposed upon
the prohibition of general restraints leaves that prohibition with but
dubious force. Thus the policy is accepted upon principle, but often
rejected in fact.
The general conclusions which may be safely asserted are as follows:
I. Apart from statute, conditions in restraint of the remarriage of
widows or widowers are legal.
2. Apart from statute, limitations until marriage, or the equivalent,
will almost invariably be sustained.
3. Conditions in partial restraint of marriage are legal, except
when in operation they are found to restrain marriage unreasonably.
(An unreasonable restraint may be one which amounts in effect to a
total restraint, or perhaps it may be merely a restraint which is har~h
or arbitrary.)
In cases where the above propositions are not applicable, a court
may decide that:
I. A condition in general restraint of marriage of a previously
unmarried person is illegal.
2. A condition in general or partial restraint of marriage is void
if no gift over is provided to take effect upon breach. ( Conversely, a
court which accepts the first proposition may confine its application to
cases where there is no gift over, and enforce the condition where there
is a gift over.)
3. A condition in general restraint of marriage is legal if the testa..:
tor did not intend to restrain marriage.
4. Language which is normally construed to be a condition in
restraint of marriage is really a limitation, which is valid.
S. A condition in partial restraint of marriage must be observed
if it is a condition precedent, without regard to its legality.
6. A condition in restraint of marriage is legal if it is attached to a
devise of real estate.
7. Any condition in restraint of marriage is legal, because (a)
there is no public policy against such conditions, or (b) a condition
imposes no obligation and, therefore, cannot effectively restrain marnage.
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The relative influence of the propositions of this second group
upon various courts will not be assessed in this summary. The decisions in the respective states should be consulted if one is interested
in determining which of these propositions will be made the basis of
future decision in any particular case. For the purposes of this more
general discussion, any more definite statements of the law than those
given above would be mere guesswork.
If such divergent results as those noted above can be reached in
fixing the requirements of public policy in the marriage-restraint problem, it seems desirable to examine the problem upon principle, to
ascertain what the public interest really demands 'and how it can best
be achieved.

III
THE POLICY EXAMINED

If a testator should give property to an unmarried woman "upon
condition that she remain unmarried," most courts would not hesitate
to pronounce such a condition illegal as being contrary to public policy.
It is unlikely, however, that any court would give a very definite explanation why the condition was against public policy. It would probably be said that marriage is favored by the law and that the public
interest requires that it be fostered and protected, and therefore, that
restraints upon marriage are not to be permitted. A few courts might
be more specific and say that marriage restraints tend to encourage
depopulation, immorality, and perhaps the contracting of undesirable
marriages because of the restraint which is put upon the law of natural
selection.
Suppose, on the other hand, that a testator gives property to a
person "so long as she remains single (or unmarried)." The same
courts which would defeat the condition mentioned in the preceding
paragraph would, almost without exception, sustain this provision. It
would be said that this is not a condition at all, but a limitation. Many
courts would find the statement of the distinction alone sufficient,
without further explanation. Others would declare that a testator
should be able to fix the limits of an estate given at any point that he
wishes, whether it be at the beneficiary's death or marriage or any
other time; and furthermore, that when a testator limits an estate until
marriage he does not intend to restrain marriage but to provide support
until marriage.
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Regardless of these arguments, the condition-limitation distinction cannot be approved in so far as it relates to the legality of restraints of marriage. It is doubtful that it represents any difference in
testamentary intention at all. If the legal distinction is unknown to the
testator, he is as likely to use one form of words as the other, whether
his intention be to restrain marriage or not. A more serious objection
is that if he is aware of the legal distinction, he will avoid the condition
and use the limitation in order to escape the charge of violating public
policy. In such a manner any marriage-restraint doctrine can be effectively nullified. If a condition in restraint of marriage is against public
policy, a limitation of an estate until marriage is against public policy
also.
Some courts have approached the problem more realistically and
have concluded that if a testator's intention is an important factor in the
legality of marriage restraints, it would be preferable to seek the intention directly. These courts have declared that conditions in restraint
of marriage are illegal only when imposed with an intention to restrain
marriage.
If the basis for the marriage-restraint doctrine is as explained in
the first paragraph above, it may be asked, of what relevance is the
intention of the testator? Conditions are said to be illegal when they
restrain marriage, that is, when they encourage beneficiaries to remain
single. A beneficiary may be expected to remain single when by doing
so she may retain a pecuniary benefit which she must otherwise lose.
It is doubtful whether a mere expression of a desire by the testator that
she not marry would have much influence upon her. Thus it would
seem that if a testator places a premium upon the beneficiary's remaining single, he will have violated public policy whether he intended to
restrain marriage or not.
It seems doubtful that the courts which have imposed the intention
rule have proceeded upon the belief that the testator's intention is
relevant in determining whether a restraint of marriage really has been
imposed. It is probable that when a testator does not intend to restrain
marriage, he intends some other result which the courts are loathe to
prevent despite an incidental restraint of marriage. It is common for
a testator who imposes a condition or limitation in restraint of marriage
to intend merely to provide support for a female beneficiary until,
at her marriage, such support presumably will no longer be needed.
This has been thought to be a perfectly reasonable testamentary pur-
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pose which ought to be given effect. As early as Scott v. Tyler 158 it was
said,
"According to Godolphin the use of a thing may be given during
celibacy, for the purpose of intermediate maintenance will not be
interpreted maliciously to a charge of restraining marriage."
A similar argument was given in Low v. Peers 159 to support the distinction between a condition and a limitation, a limitation representing, it
was said, only an attempt to give support until marriage.
It is understandable why courts are reluctant to thwart such a
reasonable testamentary desire. But can it be given effect consistently
with public policy? If the public interest requires the prohibition· of
marriage restraints, it would seem that exceptions should be permitted only upon one of two grounds: either that in the exceptional
case no harm will result from the restraint, or that there is some counter-policy- which supports the imposition of the restraint in certain
circumstances. It would be difficult to sustain a provision intended for
support until marriage upon either of these grounds. It has already
been suggested that a condition against marriage is as likely to induce
celibacy where the intention is to provide support as where the intention
is to restrain marriage. Nor can it be urged that there is any sort of
public policy which requires that a testator be permitted to terminate
an estate when it is no longer needed for the support of the beneficiary.
The best that can be said of an effort of this kind is that it represents
a natural testamentary desire. But once a requirement is fixed in the
furtherance of public policy, it would seem that exceptions should not
be made in order to effectuate purposes which, apart from public policy,
would seem to be altogether natural ~nd reasonable.
We have concluded, then, t!:ac the condition-limitation distinction
and the intention rule are :10t consistent with the acceptance of a policy
against marriage restraints, and do not, therefore, constitute justifiable
exceptions to any general prohibition of marriage restraints. The almost
complete acceptance by the courts of the condition-limitation distinction
and the growing approval of the intention rule, therefore, raise suspicions of a dissatisfaction with the marriage-restraint doctrine and
perhaps represent efforts to escape from it whenever a plausible means
appears. It is worthy of note in this connection that there are many more
limitations than conditions and undoubtedly many more conditions
158
159

Dick. 712 at 722, 21 Eng. Rep. 448 (1788).
Wilm. 364, 97 Eng. Rep. 138 (1770).
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imposed without an intention to restrain marriage than with such an
intention. Thus in adopting these rules most marriage restraints can
be sustained. It seems appropriate, therefore, to examine the policy
which is asserted to forbid marriage restraints and to ask whether any
condition or limitation in restraint of marriage should be declared
illegal.
It is not enough to say that marriage is fostered and protected by
the law. More specifically it should be asked, what harm to society
may be expectedi to result from the use of conditions and limitations
in restraint of marriage? Immorality, depopulation, the weakening of
the family, and other consequent evils, it may be said. When marriage
is effectively prevented, some of these results may tend to follow,
although it would be impossible to make any positive assertions without
the benefit of sociological data which is not available. But is a conditional or limited gift of property really capable of restraining marriage? A condition or limitation has not the force of law or of contractual obligation; it can be effective only by inducement, and the
ability of a pecuniary inducement effectively to restrain marriage seems
doubtful. It is probable, moreover, that, in a large majority of cases
which involve gifts to female beneficiaries, the support expected upon
marriage counteracts the effect of an anticipated loss of a testamentary
gift. It 'is worthy of note that the courts, in applying the conditionlimitation distinction and in permitting restraints upon remarriage,
have freed more testamentary clauses from the charge of illegality
than they have retained within the prohibition; and yet no instance has
been reported of such a provision's having deterred a beneficiary from
marriage. The social evil resulting from conditions and limitations in
restraint of marriage is doubtful to say the least; and it may be urged
with some force that a testator's intentions should not be thwarted
when the evil thereby prevented is not certain. A contention that all
marriage restraints should be permitted would not be unsupportable.
Nor would it be novel. The English courts have deprecated the Roman
rule from the time of its adoption, have adhered to it because they
believed themselves bound by precedent, and have designed several
effective means of escaping from it. One American court of last resort
has expressly repudiated it. 160
Such a conclusion, however, would undoubtedly meet with resistance from most quarters. However far the courts may be willing to go

°Commonwealth v. Stauffer,

16
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Pa. 350 (1849).
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in sustaining provisions which seem to be restrictive of marriage, few
would concede that no opposition should be made whatever. Nor can
such a position be recommended. Conceding that a condition or a
limitation does not impose an effective restraint of marriage, there
is yet a basis for refusing to approve any and every condition or
limitation terminating an estate at marriage, and for adopting a rule
which effectuates reasonable testamentary desires without approving
attempts to restrain marriage.
The above discussion has proceeded upon the assumption that if
marriage restraints are to be opposed, it is because they tend to produce harmful social consequences in their effect upon the conduct of
beneficiaries. It is only natural to assume that if such consequences do
not follow, there is no basis for imposing any sort of prohibition. Such
an assumption may not be altogether warranted. Perhaps an illustration
would serve best to explain this position.
Suppose a testator gives property to A upon condition that he kill
B. No one would doubt that such a condition would be illegal, not so
much because A would be likely to kill B, however, but because the
court would find it offensive to enforce the condition upon A's failure
to commit a crime. The analogy between this and a condition in restraint of marriage is not complete, but it suggests a possible solution to
our problem. We may not believe that marriage restraints, in effect,
produce harmful consequences; but our 'belief relates to the capacity
of a testamentary provision to impose an effective restraint, and does
not imply an approval of any effective prevention of marriage. We may
take the position, therefore, that when a testator imposes a marriage
restraint to accomplish some reasonable testamentary purpose, such
as to provide support while single, his intention will be given effect;
but when he intends to restrain marriage, his intention will be defeated, not because we believe that the beneficiary will be induced not
to marry, but because we are unwilling to divest the property given for
his failure to respect a testamentary desire which we deem to be unnatural and unreasonable.
Thus the intention rule, which was rejected as an exception to a
general prohibition of marriage restraints, can be recommended as a
preferable alternative to a complete abrogation of any prohibition. It
will probably stand more chance of general recognition than any other
rule now appl!-ed. A number of courts have already adopted it; and it
seems, indeed, that it provides the solution which most courts have
long striven for. The courts have always sought to discourage restraints
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of marriage and, at the same time, to sustain efforts to provide support
until marriage, but they were long unable to make these desires articulate in an acceptable rule. Now Godolphin's dictum that the use of a
thing may be given during celibacy finds a rationale-the offense is not
an incidental inducement to celibacy but an intention to induce celibacy. Godolphin would offer this principle to sustain all limitations
until marriage. The principle finds more rational embodiment in the
intention rule.
It should be understood that the proposed rule is to be applied
in place of and not in addition to the condition-limitation distinction.
The latter, for the reasons previously mentioned, cannot be justified.
In so far as it has represented an effort to sustain provisions for support,
that effort can be better made by applying the intention rule.
A testator who does not intend to restrain marriage may not always
intend merely to provide support while single. He may impose the
condition or limitation in an effort to keep his property in his own
family and out of the hands of a beneficiary's future spouse. The
testator cannot be charged with an effort to restrain marriage in such a
case, and the provision should be sustained.
Courts have rather generally sustained restraints of remarriage.
It is believed that the intention to restrain the remarriage of a surviving spouse is not censurable, but may be commendable, especially if
there are minor children left. It is difficult to charge that a desire
that one's widow not remarry is unnatural or unreasonable. To sustain
all restraints of remarriage, therefore, and to confine the intention rule
to restraints of the first marriage, seems unobjectionable.
It should be noted that, whatever reasons a testator may have for
not wanting his beneficiary to keep the property given after marriage,
the desire to prevent marriage is not at all common. It may be expected, therefore, that comparatively few cases will arise in which the
condition or limitation should be declared illegal. This is not to say, of
course, that the prohibited intention is never entertained. It is not unlikely that a testator may desire that a daughter remain at home and
care for her mother or some other member of her family. He may want
his daughter to enter some religious order in which marriage is impossible. It is possible that he may seek to impose a celibate life upon
a beneficiary for no good reason at all. In any of these cases the condition or limitation would be void.
Considerable latitude must be left to the courts in applying the
proposed rule. An intention to restrain marriage may be evidenced in
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innumerable ways, and the language of the will and all the surrounding
circumstances should be considered. Statements by a testator at the time
of making his will indicating an intention to restrain or not to restrain
marriage should be admissible.161 Such statements could take innumerable forms, of varying probative value. Attempts by a testator to
discourage or control his beneficiary's marital desires should be considered. Care would have to be taken with a clause in which the testator
expressed an intention not to restrain marriage. Such a statement, of
course, should not be disregarded; but one should be permitted to
prove that it is only a disguise. An intention not to restrain marriage
would not be sufficiently proved by showing that the testator intended
to provide for or contribute to the beneficiary's support, unless it appeared that he did not intend the gift as an inducement to remain
single.
Cases will arise in which nothing will appear' to indicate sufficiently
the intention with which a particular condition or limitation was
inserted. In such a case it will be necessary to presume either an
intention to restrain marriage or its absence. In the one case, the burden
would be upon the one seeking to sustain the provision to convince the
court that the testator did not intend to restrain marriage. In the other
case, the burden would be upon the one charging illegality to prove
that the testator intended to restrain marriage. Either presumption is
acceptable; but, in view ,of the fact that an intention to restrain marriage is relatively uncommon, the latter presumption is probably more
appropriate.
So far the discussion has dealt with general restraints. Something
should be said also about the so-called partial restraints. Usually they
are imposed with an intention to restrict marriage to a certain extent,
but they are not necessarily to be declared void for this reason. When
161 There is nothing in the cases dealing with the admissibility of such a statement.
The circumstances here seem sufficiently different from any others in which oral
statements by a testator may have been excluded so as not to be controlled by those
decisions. A testator's intention to restrain marriage rarely appears in the will itself,
and if all of the circumstances surrounding the execution of a will, including statements by the testator himself, are not admissible, it may be impossible to base a
finding of illegality upon anything better than a presumption. Of course, if a will
gives property to A, it would not be proper to prove later that the testator orally said
that he wanted the property to go to B. But here we are not seeking the testator's
intention in order to give effect to it, but merely as a preliminary to a determination
whether part of his will is illegal. It would seem that no rule of evidence nor anything in any wills statute is violated by admitting an oral statement by a testator
regarding his intention to restrain marriage.
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a testator attempts to prevent marriage with certain persons or into
certain classes, or before a certain age, or without the consent of certain
persons, the restraint is thought to be justified. It has been said, however, that the restraint must not be unreasonable. Care should be
taken in applying that test, for a condition should not be declared illegal
merely because it is harsh or arbitrary. A partial restraint should be
illegal when, in operation under the particular circumstances, it approaches the character of a general restraint. Thus a condition that a
beneficiary not marry a red-haired person would in a sense be unreasonable. Certainly it would be arbitrary. But it should not be held to
restrain marriage unreasonably. If, on the other hand, a condition required that the beneficiary should marry a red-haired person and none
other, it would seem to be an unreasonable partial restraint. A condition that a beneficiary marry only in the month of June would be
senseless, but it should not be ·illegal. A condition requiring the beneficiary to marry within a certain class would be unreasonable if the class
were so small that the field of choice would be extremely limited. A
condition against marrying before the age of fifty or some other unreasonable age would be invalid. So with a condition requiring consent
to marry when the consent is to be sought from those who would be
likely to withhold it. In other words, an unreasonable partial restraint,
not different in kind from a reasonable partial restraint, is illegal because it increases the probability that marriage cannot take place without breaching the condition, increases it to a point which seems unreasonable.

IV
EFFECT OF ILLEGALITY

If a court declares a condition in restraint of marriage illegal, it is
faced with the further problem of what disposition to make of the gift
to which the condition was attached. When the condition is subsequent,
it is everywhere agreed that the gift shall be taken free of the condition.162 In dealing with conditions precedent, however, the cases are
in conflict. The English common-law courts developed the rule that,
162 The authorities for this proposition are legion. The following few cases are
selected at random in support of the proposition: Morley v. Rennoldson, 2 Hare 570,
67 Eng. Rep. 235 (1843); Sullivan v. Garesche, 229 Mo. 496, 129 S. W. 949
(1910); Gard v. Mason, 169 N. C. 507, 86 S. E. 302 (1915); Watts v. Griffin,
137 N. C. 572, 50 S. E. 218 (1905); Meek v. Fox, 118 Va. 774, 88 S. E. 161
(1916); Middleton v. Rice, 4 Clark (Pa.) 7 (1845). See 2 JARMAN, WILLS, 7th ed.,
1443 (1930).
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in a case involving a devise of real estate, the beneficiary must observe
the condition if he is to take the gift, without regard to the legality
of the condition.163 This rule has been applied in one American marriage-restraint case; 164 and it has been approved in dicta in several
other cases, some of which involved legacies. 165 A different rule was
developed in England in dealing with legacies. If a condition is illegal
because it is against public policy, the condition is void and the gift is
absolute, as in the case of conditions subsequent.166 This. rule has been
applied in a number of American cases,161 most of which, however,
did not involve marriage restraints.168
In a recent New York case, Matter of Liberman,169 the Court of
Appeals applied the latter rule to an illegal partial restraint of marriage. The court asserted that this rule was supported by principle and
by the weight of American authority. The court said,
"To give the rule less force; to declare the condition void without at the same time giving effect to the gift made upon the void
condition, would be a mockery of the beneficiary and by indirection would permit a testator to accomplish a result which we hold
contrary to the 'common weal.'" 110
In an article published in I 908 on the effect of illegality of conditions precedent,111 Professor Pound contended that when a condition
precedent is declared illegal, both the condition and the gift should be
163

Seep. 1300, supra. See also Holmes v. Lysaght, 2 Bro. P. C. 261, I Eng. Rep.
931 (1733), involving a partial restraint.
164
Phillips v. Ferguson, 85 Va. 509, 8 S. E. 241 (1888).
165
Maddox v. Maddox's Admr., II Grat. (52 Va.) 804 at 816 (1854); Crawford v. Thompson, 91 Ind. 266 at 273 (1883); Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169 at
178. (1810); Knost v. Knost, 229 Mo. 170, 129 S. W. 665 at 667 (1910). All but
the last case involved legacies.
166
Stackpole v. Beaumont, 3 Ves. 89 at 96, 30 Eng. Rep. 909 (1796); Wheeler
v. Bingham, I Wils. K. B. 135 at 136, 95 Eng. Rep. 535 (1746). See also 2 ]ARMAN,
WILLS, 7th ed., 1443 (1930).
167
Brizendine v. American Trust & Savings Bank, 2Il Ala. 694, IOI So. 618
(1924); Dusbiber v. Melville, 178 Mich. 601, 146 N. W. 208 (1914); In re
Haight's Will, 51 App. Div. 310, 64 N. Y. S. 1029 (1900); Potter v. McAlpine,
3 Dem. (N. Y. Surr.) 108 (1885); Dwyer v. Kuchler, u6 N. J. Eq. 426, 174 A.
154 (1934).
168
Matter of Liberman, 279 N. Y. 458, 18 N. E. (2d) 658 (1939), is the only
case involving a marriage restraint.
.
169
279 N. Y. 458, 18 N. E. (2d) 658 (1939).
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Id., 279 N. Y. 458 at 469.
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Pound, "Legacies on Impossible or Illegal Conditions Precedent," 3 ILL. L.
REV. I (1908).
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void. To let the gift stand, he contended, is to go further than public policy requires, and defeats the intention of the testator, expressed
by putting the condition in precedent form, that nothing should vest
unless the condition were observed. The rule thus criticized, he pointed
out, originated in the civil law in a misapplication of the Roman favor
testamenti, or policy against intestacy.
Would the rule suggested by Professor Pound indirectly give
effect to the illegal condition, as held in Matter of Liberman? The
court in that case apparently overlooked the fact that when both the
condition precedent and gift are void, the performance of the condition
by the beneficiary will avail him nothing; and it cannot be said, therefore, that it is the breach of the condition by the beneficiary which
defeats the gift, which would be true if the condition were actually
being given effect. The true basis of the rule is that, since the
only way in which the gift can vest is upon observance of an illegal
condition, it cannot vest at all, and is void ab initio. There would seem
to be no policy to prevent a testator, who cannot successfully make his
gift upon the terms he desires, from withholding it altogether; and if
an intention to withhold it in such a case appears, the intention should
be given effect.
In discussing the effect of impossibility of conditions, Professor
Simes has contended that a court should attempt to discover what the
testator would have intended had he known of the impossibility.172
He suggested that if a court can infer that the testator would have
wished to give effect to the condition in spite of the impossibility, then
the court should give effect to it, whether it be precedent or subsequent;
but if the testator would not have wished to give effect to the condition
under such circumstances, then it should be excused.
In Professor Simes' arguments can be found a possible objection to
Professor Pound's rule as to illegal conditions precedent. By imposing
a condition precedent, does a testator intend that the gift should not
vest without observance of the condition even when the illegality of
the condition makes enforcement of it unlawful? Is it not possible that
when the testator imposed the condition he assumed that it was valid
and binding, and that if he had known that it was illegal he would
have made the gift without the condition? It is suggested that this
possibility be taken account of, and that a court, after declaring the
condition illegal, should uphold the gift where it can reasonably be
172 Simes, "The Effect of Impossibility upon Conditions in Wills," 34 M1cH. L.
REv. 909 (1936).

1 334

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 39

inferred that the testator, if he had known of the illegality, would have
made the gift without the condition. If this inference cannot be made,
then both the condition and the gift should be void.
Consistency would demand that the same method be followed with
conditions subsequent. A testator's intention may be as much violated
by permitting a beneficiary to retain a gift upon breach of a condition
subsequent as by permitting him to take the gift without observance
of a condition precedent; and if a testator's intention is to be sought
in determining the effect of an illegal condition in one case it should
also be sought in the other. Where different rules have been applied
to the two types of conditions, moreover, courts have been known to
draw the distinction between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent so as to reach a desired result, in seeming disregard of the form
of the words. 173 It seems desirable, therefore, to treat the two types
of conditions in the same way. Although this method may seem to be a
startling departure from the orthodox method of dealing with conditions subsequent, it is to be preferred if the arguments presented in the
above paragraphs are valid. Nor can any objection be raised to its
practicability. If a testator is informed that he may not divest a proposed gift at the beneficiary's marriage, only two rational alternatives
are open to him, and they are the same as in the case of a condition
precedent. He may either withhold the gift altogether or he may give
it without the condition. Therefore, in any case, if it is determined that
he would have made the gift without the condition, the beneficiary
should be permitted to retain it notwithstanding a breach of the condition. On the other hand, it is possible, although rarely perhaps, that
the observance of the condition was the principal motive for making
the gift. If the testator would not have made the gift had he known
that it could not be divested at marriage, the gift should be void ab
initio, as in the case of a condition precedent.
The writer is aware that the prevailing rule that a condition subsequent shall be defeated and the gift left to stand in every case is so
deeply rooted that any other rule would seem to have little chance
of acceptance. For the reasons given, however, the suggested rule seems
preferable on principle.
173 Id. at 93 2. A classic example of this is in the English case, Egerton v. Brownlow, 4 H. L. Cas. 1, IO Eng. Rep. 359 (1853), involving a gift upon condition that
the beneficiary secure a certain title. The condition was held void, but the court was
divided (fifteen judges assisting). All of the judges declaring the condition void construed it to be a condition subsequent; all of the judges declaring the condition valid
construed it to be a condition precedent.
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The rule that both illegal conditions precedent and conditions subsequent should be striken and the gifts upheld can be commended for
its simplicity. Something can be said, too, for holding that when a
testator presumes to attach an illegal condition to his gift he should
take the consequences of having his gift sustained without the condition. By means of such a penalty, it may be said, testators will be discouraged from disposing of their property unlawfully.
It seems to the writer, however, that penalties are somewhat out
of place in the construction of wills, and that a court should strive
to effectuate a testator's intentions except in so far as they are directed
to unlawful ends. It is admitted that it may seem like reaching for the
moon to seek for a testator's wishes in a matter which was not in his
mind; and it may be desirable to discourage courts from speculating
about what those wishes might be. But the important thing is to keep
the door open so that if his wishes in the matter can be found they may
be given effect. And in those cases where no sufficient evidence can
be found as to what a testator would have wished had he thought about
the illegality of his condition, it is suggested that the court adopt a
set of presumptions based upon the form of the condition. If the condition is precedent, it would be presumed that the testator intended
that nothing should vest unless the condition could be and were observed. But if the condition is subsequent, it would be presumed that
the testator, knowing of the illegality of the condition, would have
made the gift without the condition. Thus Professor Pound's rule as to
conditions precedent and the prevalent rule as to conditions subsequent
would be applied in all cases except where, upon the evidence, their
application clearly would defeat rather than effectuate a testator's
intentions.
The discussion thus far has dealt with the effect of the illegality
of conditions. Suppose a limitation is found to impose an unlawful restraint of marriage. Two alternatives are possible, as in the case of a
condition. If the testator would not have made the limited gift if he
had known that it could not be terminated as he intended, then the gift
and limitation would be held void. The other alternative presents more
difficulty. Suppose the testator would have made the gift without the
limitation. What sort of interest would he have given? A fee, a life
estate, or something else? He has not defined the interest given and
made it conditional; he has made the limitation the measure of his gift.
When property is given to a woman as long as she remains unmarried, and she never marries, the question arises as to the duration of
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her estate. This problem has arisen in many cases, and an answer to it
will furnish an answer to the present question. But the cases are in
conflict. Some say the widow takes a life estate; some say a fee. 174
It is beyond the scope of this article to seek an answer to that problem.
It will be sufficient for the present purposes to say that where a court
finds that a determinable life estate is given, the illegality of the limitation will leave an absolute life estate; and where a determinable fee
is given, an absolute fee will be left.
A presumption would be needed here also if there were nothing
to indicate the testator's wishes. Since a limitation resembles a condition subsequent more than a condition precedent, termination of the
estate following an original vesting, it would seem better to presume
that the testator would have made the gift without limitation.
In conclusion, the expressed intention of a testator is necessarily
defeated by the invalidation of an imposed condition or limitation in
restraint of marriage. His intention, however, should be defeated
to no greater extent than public policy requires, and should be effectuated to the limits of the prohibition. Gifts which have been freed of
illegal restrictions are not necessarily to be taken absolutely, for a
condition or a limitation should not be treated merely as a form of
words, which can be stricken to permit another form of words, the
gift, to stand unqualified. In disposing of gifts thus shorn, it is necessary to seek for an intention not expressed. With the aid of presumptions, the wishes which the testator would have expressed had he known
of the illegality of his restrictions must be sought and given effect. The
result may be that the gift will stand or it may be that the gift, along
with the condition or limitation, will be void.
174

122 A. L. R. 7 at 75 (1939).

